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THE PARADOXES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
RUSSELL L. CAPLAN*
INTRODUCTION

It has become fashionable in some quarters to suppose that
the Constitution does not set out the principles which ensure a just
society, but instead merely describes the procedures by which
these governing principles are to be hammered out. At bottom is a
disquiet about the proper role of a "basically undemocratic"1 and

"imperial ' 2 judiciary in a representative democracy. In a true democracy, runs the complaint, only politically responsible, that is,
elected, officials should have the power to effect major policy ini-

tiatives. The courts, an anomaly in this system, should only act so
as to allow the crucial political decisions to be made in the more
"democratic" forums.
Two major statements of this position, by Professor John Hart

Ely' and Professor Jesse H. Choper, 4 offer blueprints of the Constitution which are sometimes parallel and sometimes at right angles.
Yet both Ely and Choper agree that the best method of safeguarding rights is through a "passive" judiciary, because judicial review
in constitutional matters is fundamentally incompatible with
* Attorney, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice. A.B. Dartmouth, 1972;
B.A. Oxford, 1974; J.D. Yale, 1977. For their ideas and encouragement, the author and
reader are indebted to Charles Chehebar, Robert L. Goodman, and W. Michael Reisman.
While assistance is collective, responsibility is individual, and the conclusions reached
herein should not necessarily be ascribed to any of these teachers, friends, or employer.
1. Rehnquist, Dedicatory Address-Act Well Your Part: Therein All Honor Lies, 7
PEPPERDINE L. REV. 227, 232 (1980); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448
U.S. 555, 606 (1980)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Cf. P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTrrUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 204 (1970)(the Court is and must remain undemocratic, and
should frustrate the will of the majority only when it is essential to the protection of minority rights).
2. Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary?, 41 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 104 (1975); R.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Have the Judges Done Too Much?, TIME, Jan.
22, 1979, at 91; Winter, The Growth of JudicialPower, in THE JUDICIARY INA DEMOCRATIC
SocIETY 29 (L. Theberge ed. 1979).
3. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).

4. J. CHOPER,

JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS

(1980).
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American democratic, or majority, rule. Only in the narrowly defined role of protecting individual rights should the courts assume
an activist stance. How the courts are to know precisely when this
role is being thrust upon them forms the tension underlying this
increasingly influential school of constitutional interpretation.
I.

OLD DILEMMAS AND THE NEW PROCESS

The paradoxes, or dilemmas of justification, of judicial review
in a democratic society were presented most succinctly by Justice
Frankfurter:
The Court is not saved from being oligarchic because it professes to act in the
service of humane ends. As history amply proves, the judiciary is prone to
misconceive the public good by confounding private notions with constitutional requirements, and such misconceptions are not subject to legitimate
displacement by the will of the people except at too slow a pace. Judges appointed for life whose decisions run counter to prevailing opinion cannot be
voted out of office and supplanted by men of views more consonant with it.
They are even farther removed from democratic pressures by the fact that
their deliberations are in secret and remain beyond disclosure either by periodic reports or by such a modern device for securing responsibility to the
electorate as the "press conference." 5

Distillable from this passage is the following syllogism: the courts
can (1) frustrate the majority by striking down legislative enactments, (2) do so on the basis of their "own," possibly idiosyncratic,
interpretation of the Constitution, (3) while remaining insulated
from the "democratic," i.e., electoral, process. Hence the judiciary's review power, not being genuinely democratic, should be severely limited. Yet, this non-democratic institution, in important
ways, does serve to further our democratic system.
The ways in which the paradoxes represented by this syllogism have been faced or ignored since Chief Justice Marshall's day
define the various critical schools of jurisprudence. Thus, a century
ago the dominant approach was the naturalist reductionism of
Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell, for whom the principles of
law were discoverable, finite in number, and uncomplicated: the
fundamental things applied. 6 Such an approach denies the exis5. American Fed'n of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 555-56
(1949)(Frankfurter, J., concurring)(footnote omitted).
6. A. SuTrmA, THE LAW AT HARVARD 174-78 (1967); Hurst, Legal Elements in
United States History, in LAW INAMERIcAN HIsToRY 3, 60-61 (D. Fleming & B. Bailyn eds.
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tence of any paradox, for it considers the legitimacy of judicial review to lie in the nonarbitrary exercise of power that is thought to
be extrajudicially ordained.
By the turn of the century a pragmatic skepticism of the
Holmesian variety7 had substantially repudiated the idea of universally valid principles, evidently for good. Out of this basic skepticism came theories designed more or less explicitly to reconcile

authoritative determination of non-absolute values with the principles of majority rule: Sociological Jurisprudence, Legal Realism,
and Process Jurisprudence." American Sociological Jurisprudence,
which is mainly associated with Roscoe Pound,9 was in part a reaction to Langdellian scientific reductionism, as was the cluster of
writers generally known as "legal realists." Legal Realism 0 rejected the reliance on black-letter rules as the sole determinants of

legal outcomes and stressed instead the kaleidoscopic factors affecting decision, in an attempt to increase awareness of the subtle
political implications of the judicial function."
Process Jurisprudence, characterized chiefly by advocacy of
"reasoned elaboration,"1 2 concentrated on the need for articulation
1971); Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The American Law School, in id. at 403, 435-41, 46768.
7. See, e.g., 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881); Note, Holmes, Peirce'and Legal
Pragmatism, 84 YALE L.J. 1123 (1975). John Chipman Gray was also of this persuasion. J.
GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (1909).

8. See generally G. WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADrIoN 230-31, 251-52 (1976).
9. See, e.g., Pound, The Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence,24 HARv. L.
REV. 591 (1911); Pound, The Theory of JudicialDecision, 36 HARv. L. REV. 641, 802, 940
(1923). Pound's method was endorsed by Benjamin Cardozo in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 65-141 (1921). See generally White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism:
Jurisprudenceand Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REv. 999
(1972).
10. The leading tracts include: J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930); Cook,
Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A.B.A.J. 303 (1927); Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930). See W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL
REALISM (1968); W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOvEMENTr (1973). A thorough history of realism at Yale, the hub of the movement in its heyday during the 1930's, is
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 459 (1979). A useful general summary is contained in E. PURCELL,
THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 74-94 (1973).
11. Of course, the notion of rules passed by the legislature and interpreted by the
courts as the only source of constitutional law has become obsolete in an administrative
state which assigns major policy functions to many and assorted bureaucracies. See generally P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITrTIONAL DECISIONMAKING (1975); see also J. CHOPER,
supra note 4, at 371-76; J. ELY, supra note 3, at 131-34.
12. The phrase comes from H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 161 (tent. ed.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

of the means and reasons by which judges arrived at their decisions.13 To the proponents of reasoned elaboration, judges did not
find law in the "scientific" sense nor did they create it in the realist sense. Instead, they reasoned toward a result and articulated
the process which led them to it.14 In a famous phrase, Henry Hart
stipulated that the Court should1 5 reach its decisions through the
"maturity of collective thought."

In part, Process Jurisprudence was a response to the skepticism often associated with realism concerning the existence of articulable standards for decision. The requirement of detailed expli1958). Aside from this preeminent process jurisprudence text, and virtually every Supreme
Court Foreword in the HARVARD LAW RE IEw written during the 1950's, other exemplars of
the early process school are: L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF (1940); Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the JudicialProcess:The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV.L.
REv. 1 (1957); Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARv. L. REv. 376 (1946); Hart, The
Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
HARv. L. REV. 1362 (1953), revised and reprinted in P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 330-60 (2d
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER]; Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof
ConstitutionalLaw, 73 IA-v. L. REV. 1 (1959).
13. Among the more refined expositions of early process doctrine, Wechsler's theory of
"neutral principles" was specifically designed to counter the charge, made by Judge Learned
Hand, that judicial review should be curtailed since it is not based on the constitutional text
and therefore lacks the standards to check bold discretion wielded in the manner of a third
legislative chamber. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958). Wechsler responded that courts
can legitimately exercise their power through reasoning which employs neutral principles in
order to generate an impartial and logically consistent pattern of decision. Wechsler, supra
note 12, at 19.
Professor Wechsler's article itself has spawned a considerable literature. The best discussions include: Bork, NeutralPrinciples and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J.
1 (1971); Golding, PrincipledDecision-Making and the Supreme Court, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
35 (1963); Mueller & Schwartz, The Principleof Neutral Principles,7 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 571
(1960); Pollak, Racial Discriminationand JudicialIntegrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959). A most sensitive discussion of Wechsler's theory and its
ramifications is Deutsch, Neutrality,Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169 (1968). The appraisal by
Professor Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles,78 COLUM. L. REv.
982 (1978), appears in an issue of the COLUMBIA LAW Rs.vmw devoted to Professor Wechsler's work.
14. White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:JurisprudentialCriticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. RFv. 279, 289 (1973). See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 12, at 67
(legal propositions "formulated by a process of reasoned development of authoritative
premises").
15. Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term-Foreword:The Time Chart of the Justices,
73 H v.L. REV. 84, 100 (1959). See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 24 (1958)(Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)(Court's decision is the "unanimous conclusion of a long-matured deliberative
process"). The idea is vigorously disparaged in Arnold, ProfessorHart's Theology, 73 HARv.
L. REv. 1298 (1960).
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cation would also render judges more publicly accountable for their
decisions and hence more integrally a part of the democratic system. Process Jurisprudence in its early phase was the jurispru-

dence of a resurgent post-war America committed to democratic
values whose central if not absolute status had been recently and
dramatically vindicated.1 6 These values and traditions were to be
implemented by a correspondingly enlightened and competent judiciary. Importantly, members of the Process school
had highly developed and sophisticated views about the proper relationship
of the Supreme Court to other governing institutions. They were anxious to
preserve the Court's prestige by ensuring that it did not overstep the limits of
its function and thereby take itself into areas of decision-making in which it
was not equipped to deal, and in which it was sure to clash with other
branches of government. The proper way to prevent such quixotic forays was
to impress upon the Court's members a sense of the kinds of controversies
which were justiciable and which
sorts of analytical processes were likely to
17
produce respected opinions.

This remains the program of the Process school. What distinguishes the school's late phase (beginning in the late 1960's) from

the early phase is the advent of the Warren Court, which confounded the Process scholars' requirement of principled articula-

tion"' even as it took great strides in accomplishing these scholars'

"progressive" agenda in the field of civil liberties.19 While early
Process writers sought to justify or bring into theoretical line such
decisions as Brown v. Board of Education"° and establish the idea
16. E. PURCELL, supra note 10, at 270-72; G. WHrr, supra note 8, at 231. See Rostow,
The Democratic Characterof JudicialReview, 66 HAv. L. REV. 193 (1952).
17. White, supra note 14, at 290.
18. Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84
HARV. L. REV. 769, 774-75 (1971). As one of the Warren Court's warmest supporters
reflected:
Nearly all the rules of constitutional law written by the Warren Court ... impress me as wiser and fairer than the rules they replace. I would support nearly
all as important reforms if proposed in a legislative chamber or a constitutional
convention. In appraising them as judicial rulings, however, I find it necessary to
ask whether an excessive price was paid by enlarging the sphere and changing
the nature of constitutional adjudication.
A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SuPREmE CouRT iN AM cAN GOVERNMENT 102 (1976). See also
Bickel & Wellington, supra note 12, at 3-6; Kurland, The Supreme Court, 1963
Term-Foreword:"Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive
Branches of the Government," 78 HARv. L. REV. 143, 144-45 (1964).
19. See, e.g., Horwitz, The Jurisprudence of Brown and the Dilemmas of Liberalism,
14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 599 (1979); Wechsler, supra note 12, at 27-34.
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

456

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

of process theory in general, later Process scholarship aims to consolidate the recognized gains in civil liberties made under Earl
Warren's stewardship by declaring that Court's ,opinions to be the
paradigm against which subsequent decisions are to be evaluated.
No longer is the Warren corpus an embarrassment to Process purists; rather, the Warren Court is appreciated for having truly understood the nature and function of the judicial process, and it is
to this understanding that constitutional theory must henceforth
address itself.
Professors Ely and Choper adhere to the basic tenets of what
may be called post-Warren, or New Process, Jurisprudence. Like
others of their cloth,21 they see the achievement of the Warren
Court, that judicial Camelot,2 2 as establishing the elevation of certain rights (such as voting) as "too fundamental to be ... burdened or conditioned. ' 23 This ideal, as one critic noted, could pro21. Other examples of writing classifiable as New Process scholarship are: C. BLACK,
DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW (1981); P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEciSIONMAK-

ING (1975); L. LUSKY, By WHAT RIGHT? (1975); L. TamE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(1978); Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3

(1970)[hereinafter cited as Black, Unfinished Business]; Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975
Term-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1976); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107 (1976);
Goodpaster, The Constitution and FundamentalRights, 15 ARiz. L. REV. 479 (1973); Karst,
The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 HARv.L. REV. 1 (1977); Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword:
Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1973);
Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269 (1975); Wright, Judicial
Review and the Equal Protection Clause, 15 HAlV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1980).
22. Professor Tribe's nostalgia is typical:
I believe that the course of the Burger Court, at least in its first years, will eventually be marked not as the end of an era of exaggerated activism on behalf of
individuals and minorities, but as a sad period of often opposite activism,
cloaked in the worn-out if well-meant disguise of judicial restraint.
L. TRIBE, supranote 21, at v. Cf. Ely, The Centralityand Limits of Motivation Analysis, 15
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1155 (1978): "Surely there is little danger of the present Court's overreacting on the side of liberty or equality." Professor Choper, however, while acknowledging
the unequaled record of the Warren Court in the protection of individual freedoms, sees
some continuity. J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 103-22; Choper, The Burger Court: Misperceptions Regarding JudicialRestraint and Insensitivity to Individual Rights, 30 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 767 (1979).
23. Harper v. Virginia Bd.of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). Professor Ely, who
clerked for Chief Justice Warren, dedicated the book to him. J. ELY, supra note 3, at v. For
literature supporting the work of the Warren Court, see, e.g., A. Cox, THE WARREN COURT
(1968); A. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE (1971); Black, Unfinished Business, supra note 21;
Karst & Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection,1967
SuP. CT. REV. 39; Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Soci-
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duce a result orientation which avoided use and articulation of
principle, precedent, and original intent in the service of "current
egalitarian notions, of how a modern democracy should be organized.

' 24

The New Process writers are, however, like the early Pro-

cess scholars, concerned with restoring both an appropriate methodology to the Supreme Court's opinions and a cautiously defined
legitimate role for the courts in the democratic process. The appropriate methodology is naturally influenced by the special mission
of New Process scholars, which is to restore the Warren Court's
preoccupation with those individual rights thought to be necessarily entailed by a just social order. Both Ely and Choper begin,
therefore, with a primary (if not exclusive) commitment to individual rights25 and the premise that the judiciary is undemocratic because it is antimajoritarian" and, hence, must be restricted, when
deciding constitutional cases, to those cases where individual rights
and liberties are at issue, in order to maintain a plausible democratic posture.
Though the arguments for New Process are couched literally
in terms of the Warren Court's approach, versus that of its predecessors or successor, there is always significant overlap in personnel
from one historical "Court" to another. The quarrel is really between two styles of adjudication, one predicated on protecting "basic" or "fundamental" values against government interference,28
the other focusing "not on whether this or that substantive value is
unusually important or fundamental, but rather on whether the
opportunity to participate either in the political processes by
ety-Judicial Activism or Restraint?,54 CoRNL.L L. Rav. 1 (1968).
24. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 686 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 662 (1969)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
25.

J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 60-128; J. ELY, supra note 3, at 73-75.

26. J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 6, 60; J. ELY, supra note 3, at 4-5.
27.
28.

J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 64-65; J. ELY, supra note 3, at 73-179.
The pedigree extends back to Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)("evolving

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society"); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)(rights which are "of the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Protection of fundamental rights may also be accomplished by negative implication, as by the

discovery of "conduct that shocks the conscience," Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172
(1952), though not simply, as one hornbook has it, that which "shocks the conscious." The

approach is, of course, traceable to Chief Justice Marshall's vision of a perdurable charter
affording guidance throughout an infinite and unknowable future. Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387 (1821); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).

See also B. CARnozo, supra note 9, at 76-85.
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which values are approximately identified and accommodated, or
in the accommodation those processes have reached, has been unduly constricted."2 9 This latter approach, influenced to a greater or
lesser extent by Justice Stone's famous footnote four in United
States v. CaroleneProducts Co.,30 is the one adopted by New Process writers. For New Process scholarship, the answers to the paradoxes of judicial review are: first, the popular will, as demonstrated
by legislative actions, is not threatened, since the judiciary's task is
to facilitate, not hinder, that process; second, judges do not inject
their own preferences in the guise of "fundamental values," since
they are simply custodians of an open system in which such values
meet and do combat elsewhere; and, finally, the Court's removal
from the hurly-burly of the political arena buttresses the integrity
of the Court's policing, and only proper democratic, function.
What New Process advocates have not to date completely understood is that in practice as well as in theory there is no necessary gap between the two approaches. By misunderstanding the legitimate and essential function of the courts in a constitutional
democracy, by apologizing for judicial review as an interloper, in
Alexander Bickel's phrase a "deviant institution,"31 Choper is led
to withdraw the Court's jurisdiction from areas where it might
prove helpful, and Ely is forced to weave a logically inconsistent
theory aspiring to judicial modesty that in the end sanctions more
intervention than the doctrine it is meant to replace.
29. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 77. Notable examples of the process approach include: San
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105 (1973)(Marshall, J., dissenting);
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 628 (1969)(Warren, C.J.); Garrison
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)("speech concerning public affairs is more than selfexpression; it is the essence of self-government"); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)(First and Fourteenth Amendments embody our "profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1,17
(1964); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 507-08 (D.D.C. 1967)(Wright, J.), afl'd as modified sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir.), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801
(1969). See also Z. CHAFER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 30 (1920)(fundamental policy of First
Amendment is "the open discussion of public affairs"); A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND
rrs RELATION TO SELF-GovERNMNT 39 (1948)(First Amendment represents an "unlimited
guarantee of the freedom of public discussion").
30. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n. 4 (1938). An opinion by Justice Stone antecedent to
Carolene Products likewise intimates a two-tiered standard of judicial review: South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 n. 2 (1938).
31.

A. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (1962).

1981]

PARADOXES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
II. THE

LEAST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH

A. Footnote Omitted: The New Process Criticisms of Prevailing
Doctrine
To assert, as Ely and Choper do, that judicial review is inherently undemocratic requires a working definition of what "democratic" is. Yet democracy is one of those grand concepts, like justice, that is as evocative as it is amorphous: it is much easier to say
what is not democratic than to say what is. 3 2 One well-accepted

definition describes democracy as a political system "in which public policies are made, on a majority basis, by representatives subject to effective popular control at periodic elections which are conducted on the principle of political equality and under conditions
of political freedom.""3
The practical definitions and assumptions concerning democracy offered by Choper and Ely agree on and recognize the importance of political (voting) equality and freedom of expression as
part of the "core" 34 or "keystone" 5 of our democratic system.
Where judicial review runs afoul of the democratic process, according to Ely and Choper, is with respect to the representative and
majoritarian aspects which purportedly inhere in democratic forms
of government. For Choper, majority rule has historically been the
critical sign of a democratic system both in theory and practice.3
It is, in fact, because effective majority rule depends on the right to
vote and the right to freely express and exchange ideas, that
Choper considers these rights as essential to democracy.37 Representative government is only a second-best alternative. "In theory,
the majoritarian ideal would be most faithfully fulfilled by having
all governmental regulations enacted by plebiscite or, better yet, at
national 'town meetings' in which all electors could participate by
framing the issues as well as by casting their ballots."33 Given
32. E. CAHN, THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE (1949). See B. CRICK, IN DEFENCE OF PoLrTICs 5673 (1964).
33. H. MAYo, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 79 (1960), quoted in McCleskey, JudicialReview in a Democracy: A Dissenting Opinion, 3 HOUSTON L. REv. 354, 357
(1966). See also J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 5; Wright, supra note 23, at 9.
34. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 7, 122.
35.

J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 4.

36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 5. Cf. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 77 (a representative government is well suited
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Choper's view of democracy, as premised on direct popular control
of policymakers, judicial review falls short of the democratic ideal
(or minimum) because the judiciary is not politically sensitive to
the majority will, freely arrived at and expressed. 9 A typical comment of Choper's is that "irrespective of the content of its decisions, the process of judicial review is not democratic because the
4
Court is not a politically responsible institution.' 0
Ely's view of democracy is similar, though less systematic, in
the exposition of what he understands by "democracy." For Ely, it
41
is well established that our democracy is a representative one
whose central commitment is to government by consent of a majority of the governed. 42 Ely thus parallels Choper's emphasis on popular control and political accountability. 4' Accordingly, this is for
Ely the central function and problem of judicial review: "a body
that is not elected or otherwise politically responsible in any significant way is telling the people's elected representatives that they
4
cannot govern as they'd like."
The picture of democratic government that materializes is
that of an "open" and self-governing society 5 in which the substantive laws are effected by political coalitions through fair procedures and methods. These methods do not permit excessive influence on the substantive outcome of the legislative process, for that
process is to remain receptive to each vying faction regardless of its
political popularity. The Constitution, as Justice Holmes remarked, "is made for people of fundamentally differing views.'4 6
In so "viewing the Constitution as a framework independent of any
immutable catalog of allowable and forbidden ends,' 47 the primary
to providing self rule without requiring personal participation in legislation by the general
populace).
39. J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 6, 10, 48.
40. Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
41. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 5. See also id. at 77-88.
42. Id. at 7.
43. Id. at 4 & n*.

44. Id. at 4-5.
45. L. LUSKY, supra note 21, at 11. Cf. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 105 ("virtually everyone
agrees that the courts should be heavily involved in reviewing impediments to free speech,
publication, and political association.").

46. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905)(Holmes, J., dissenting). See also Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388, 406 (1960)(Douglas, J., dissenting); Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S.
606, 609 (1903)(Holmes, J.).
47. Tribe, Foreword, supra note 21, at 13.

PARADOXES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1981]

task of a theory of judicial review becomes the identification of
those rights which are procedural, structural rather than substantive, and which yield unfair advantage to no particular social or
economic view.4s
It is unsurprising, then, that at the core of Ely's theory of constitutional adjudication is the notion that "the original Constitution was principally, indeed I would say overwhelmingly, dedicated
to concerns of process and structure and not to the identification
and preservation of specific substantive values." 4 9 This is necessary

to Ely's argument that the judiciary, which is charged with upholding the Constitution, is relegated to process upkeep, thereby leaving the value selection to the legislatureY° Close judicial scrutiny is
justified only when these special procedural rights are implicated,
because they regulate the use and consequences of governmental
power. Such rights are fundamental "because [they are] preservative of all rights." 51
Ely finds the justification for this distinction between types of
rights, and hence between corresponding intensities of judicial review, in Carolene Products footnote four which, for him,
prefigured and embodied the Warren Court's version of representative democracy:
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibi-

tion of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are
deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.

It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about re-

peal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial
48.
49.

Goodpaster, supra note 21, at 482.
J. ELY, supra note 3, at 92. "The Constitution is ...

a sort of checklist, enumerat-

ing in a general way those things the central government may do and by implication denying
it power to do anything else." Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARv. L. Rzv. 693,
701 (1974)(footnote omitted). For the view that the Constitution and Bill of Rights possess
definite underlying ethical content, see R. MacIver, The PhilosophicalBackground of the
Constitution, in PoLmics AND SocmT 357 (D. Spitz ed. 1969); Griswold, The Right to be
Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. Rav. 216 (1960).
50. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 87. See generally Williamson, PoliticalProcess or Judicial
Process: The Bill of Rights and the Framers of the Constitution, 23 J. POL. 199 (1961);
Note, Plurality Decisions and JudicialDecisionmaking, 94 HAxv. L. Rav. 1127, 1144-46
(1981); Note, A Process-OrientedApproach to the Contract Clause, 89 YALE L.J. 1623
(1980).
51. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). Accord, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.

533, 562 (1964).
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scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than
are most other types of legislation ...
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review
of statutes directed at particular religions . . . or national . . . or racial minorities: whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which
may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry. ....
.1

This is what the "deep

structure" 53

of the Constitution, embraced

by the Warren Court" and putatively shunned by its successor,
requires: a "participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review" ' 5 which leaves the selection and accommodation of substantive values to the political branches and the
fine-tuning of the democratic process to the judiciary, the institution best equipped to accomplish that task.56
Footnote four has, of course, been used to justify judicial activism in the area of civil liberties coupled with restraint in other,
mostly "economic," matters. Thus, for Ely it is something which
mediates between the text of a Constitution largely given over to
matters of democratic process and a countermajoritarian judiciary.
Unlike some Courts, which impose their personal preferences without pausing to justify their decisions by reference to constitutional
authority, 57 the Warren Court "by and large.. . attempted to defend its decisions in terms of inferences from values the Constitution marks as special."58 In his insistence on careful reasoning from
legitimate premises, Ely reflects the debt owed by the New Process
to the Old.5" For Ely, the values the Constitution marks as special,
52. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938)(Stone, J.),
quoted in J. ELY, supra note 3, at 75-76 (citations omitted). The political history which

resulted in footnote 4 and related judicial pronouncements is examined in Bixby, The
Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights: Another Look at United
States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741 (1981).
53. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 73.
54. Id. at 74-75.
55. Id. at 87.
56. Id.
57. Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
947-49 (1973).

58. Id. at 943 (emphasis deleted).
59. See Ely & Dershowitz, Harris v. New York: Some Anxious Observations on the
Candorand Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1199 (1971)("there
is little room for disagreement about the desirability in Supreme Court adjudication of reasoned argument as opposed to arrogant pronunciamento or ... gross negligence concerning
the state of the record and the controlling precedents")(footnote omitted). See also A. Cox,
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those which the New Process is concerned with elaborating, are the
values which are in some way grounded in footnote four.6°
Distinguishing permissible types of judicial activism from nonpermissible types, the soon-to-be Justice Jackson anticipated Ely's

credo and imagery:
The presumption of validity which attaches in general to legislative acts is
frankly reversed in the case of interferences with free speech and free assembly, and for a perfectly cogent reason. Ordinarily, legislation whose basis in
economic wisdom is uncertain can be redressed by the processes of the ballot
box or the pressures of opinion. But when the channels of opinion and of
peaceful persuasion are corrupted or clogged, these political correctives can
no longer be relied on, and the democratic system is threatened at its most
vital point. In that event the Court, by intervening, restores the processes of
democratic government; it does not disrupt them. 1

Thus, the rationale for Ely's process orientation is not new. What

is new is the central pride of place given to it as explanatory of all
facets of judicial operations, and its supposed incompatibility with
supra note 18 at 28, 113-14 (Court's inability to articulate principles of sufficient abstract-

ness accounts for its failure satisfactorily to resolve such issues as the constitutional status
of abortion, executive privilege, and the Vietnam War); A. GOLDBERG, supra note 23, at 73
(distinctive feature of the Warren Court is that "its members acknowledged and pursued,
with considerable success, the ideal of principled adjudication").
60. Ely, supra note 57, at 933-34. It is because adjudication is "principled" and based
on footnote 4 that Ely can steer between what he calls, after Thomas Grey, "interpretivism," a method of constitutional interpretation stressing fidelity to the constitutional text or
inferences fairly derivable therefrom, and "non-interpretivism," which holds that the text's
specific meaning must be filled in from extraconstitutional sources, e.g., fundamental values.
J. ELY, supra note 3, at 1-72. Cf. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CH. L. REV. 723, 729 (1974)(footnote 4 "may indeed point the way toward an
acceptable mean between crabbed literalism in constitutional interpretation and a roving
commission to correct social ills"). See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980); Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,27
STAN.L. REv. 703 (1975); Developments in the Law-The Constitution and the Family, 93
HARv. L. REV. 1156, 1168-77 (1980). As Ely notes, "[c]onstitutional provisions exist on a
spectrum ranging from the relatively specific to the extremely open-textured." J. ELY, supra
note 3, at 13. Provisions like the Ninth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment-its

due process, equal protection, and privileges and immunities clauses-are "invitations to
import into the constitutional decision process considerations that will not be found in the
language of the amendment or the debates that led up to it." J. ELY, supra note 3, at 14.
See Bickel, The Original Understandingand the SegregationDecision, 69 HAxv. L. REv. 1,
63 (1955); L. TRIBE, supra note 21, at iii ("the Constitution is an intentionally incomplete,
often deliberately indeterminate structure for the participatory evolution of political ideals
and governmental practices").
61. R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 285 (1941). See also F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREmE COURT 50-51 (1938); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77, 95 (1949)(Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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the ascertainment of fundamental values. Accordingly, Ely, much
more concerned with tLe methodology of legal reasoning than
Choper, 2 devotes the fir.t half of his work63 to explaining why the
various theories, slogans and catchwords of differing vintage and
vogue-substantive due process, fundamental values, natural law,
neutral principles, reason (i.e., reasoned elaboration), tradition,
consensus, and predicting what posterity will regard as progress-are logically incoherent, undemocratic, or both. The Court
is, therefore, restricted to policing the channels of political communication and accommodation, and is necessarily centered on the
vindication of individual rights: a constitutional traffic officer.
B. Streamlining the Judiciary
As an apostle of judicial restraint, Choper is a descendant of
James Bradley Thayer, who at the turn of the century taught the
virtues of judicial circumspection. It was up to the legislature, said
Thayer, as the political arm of the government, to engage in social
experimentation. Courts were not to hold legislation unconstitutional unless "those who have the right to make laws have not
merely made a mistake, but have made a very clear one,-so clear
that it is not open to rational question."'" Thayer consequently
maintained that, as the judiciary siphoned power from the legislatures by enhancing their scope of review over legislative actions,
public confidence in legislatures would decrease because of their
diminished importance. Yet, confidence in the judiciary would also
dwindle, since its enhanced power would spark doubts concerning
judicial integrity and impartiality.65 Steeped in the traditions of
62. "It is [the] impact of the Supreme Court's . . .decisions, rather than the question
of whether as a matter of substantive constitutional doctrine the Court overstepped its
proper bounds, that is the critical issue here." J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 122. See also id.
at 79. But see id. at 2: "The purposes of this book is to. . .advance a principled, functional,
and desirable role for judicial review in our democratic political system."
63. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 1-72.
64. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7
HARv. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). Thayer by no means originated the rule of clear mistake, but
rather drew upon the preceding century's scholarly and judicial authorities. See id. at 13849. Thayer's rule survives as the mainspring of the "rational basis" test for cases involving
non-fundamental rights. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979).
65. In his essays on the life of Chief Justice Marshall, Thayer wrote:
The people, all this while, become careless as to whom they send to the legislature; too often they cheerfully vote for men whom they would not trust with an
important private affair, and when these unfit persons are found to pass foolish
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Dean Thayer's Harvard, Felix Frankfurter, over his long career,
developed a sophisticated theory of judicial restraint which, like
Justice Brandeis's techniques, 8 depended on procedural mechanisms to avoid judicial review of constitutional matters whenever
possible.17 These devices of avoidance-such as standing, ripeness,
the case-or-controversy requirement-were called the "passive virtues" by Frankfurter's foremost disciple, Alexander Bickel.
Professor Bickel's major trilogy of constitutional meditations 8
span and chronicle an attempt to wed a Frankfurterian circumscribed judiciary to a court entrusted with defining and defending
enduring moral values.6 9 Though the Supreme Court was limited to
deciding constitutional issues "only on the basis of general princiand bad laws, and the courts step in and disregard them, the people are glad
that these wiser gentlemen on the bench are so ready to protect them against
their more immediate representatives ...
The tendency of a common and easy resort to [judicial review], now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden
its sense of moral responsibility.
J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 104, 107 (1901). This hypothesis, yet to be empirically proved, is
taken as well from earlier writing, notably Judge Gibson's dissent in Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg.
& Rawl. 330, 343, 355 (Pa. 1825). See also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188
(1974)(Powell, J., concurring); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692 (1973); Holtzman
v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1314 (1973); Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution:
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 VIL. L. REv. 3,
27 (1978). Derived from the same premises is Frankfurter's insistence that "[i]n a democratic society like ours, relief must come through an aroused public conscience that sears the
conscience of the people's representatives." Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 270 (1962)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
66. See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936)(Brandeis, J., concurring).
67. See generally Mendelson, The Influence of James B. Thayer upon the Work of
Holmes, Brandeis, and Frankfurter,31 VAND. L. REv. 71 (1978). Holmes, Thayer's friend
and colleague on the Harvard faculty, employed Thayeresque reticence in declining to invalidate statutes challenged on substantive due process grounds, unless they lacked any reasonable justification-a variation of the clear mistake rule. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 567 (1923)(Holmes, J., dissenting); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26
(1915)(Holmes, J., dissenting).
68. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962)[hereinafter cited as A. BICKEL,
LEAST

DANGEROUS

BRANCH](for a discussion of the passive virtues, see id. at 111-98, a revi-

sion of Bickel, Foreword:The Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1961)); A. BICKEL, THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (2d ed. 1978)[hereinafter cited as A. BICKEL,
IDEA OF PROGRESS]; A. BICKEL, THE MORxITY OF CONSENT (1975)[hereinafter cited as A.
BICKEL, MORALITv OF CONSENT].

69. A. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 68, at 24, 26, 68, 236, 239. See
generally Holland, American Liberals and Judicial Activism: Alexander Bickel's Appeal
from the New to the Old, 51 IND. L.J. 1025 (1976); Purcell, Alexander M. Bickel and the
Post-Realist Constitution, 11 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 521 (1976).
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ple, '7 0 the Court may, when it is not necessary to decide on constitutional principles, invoke the passive virtues and avoid supporting
or invalidating a principle. The passive virtues, explained Bickel,
"are the techniques that allow leeway to expediency without abandoning principle. '71 Bickel came to realize that decisions to use or
avoid principle, themselves lacked a guiding principle, which
meant the Court largely indulged in unprincipled, pragmatic discretion. 72 By the time he wrote The Morality of Consent, Bickel
had taken refuge in a self-contained morality of procedure founded
on the necessity of protecting the integrity of the judicial process,
and, by extension, the political process as a whole. This was a morality practically divorced from any moral imperatives. 78 Expedience itself was enshrined in the Burkean "computing principle,"
the balancing of entrenched social norms against the demands of
current political pressures. 4
Professor Choper's view of the judiciary is similarly informed
by the tension between principle and expedience. Choper's solution
is to restrict the Court's presumably principled decisionmaking to
discrete areas which pragmatic considerations indicate are the
most appropriate. For Choper, the Court's function-to remain activist in protecting individual rights and passive in all other controversies-derives from both theoretical and practical considerations. On the theoretical side, the Court is, simply,
countermajoritarian. "In the main, the effect of judicial review in
ruling legislation unconstitutional is to nullify the finished product
of the lawmaking process. ' 5 On the practical front, the Court risks
expending its limited institutional capital and hence its effective70. A. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 68, at 247. Bickel's conception of
general principles that are neutral and broadly applicable is taken from Wechsler's formulation. See note 13 supra.
71. A. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 68, at 71.
72. Gerald Gunther pithily summarized Bickel's thesis as "100% insistence on principle, 20% of the time." Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment
on Principleand Expediency in JudicialReview, 64 CoLuM. L. REV. 1, 3 (1964).
73. "[L]egal technicalities are the stuff of law, and piercing through a particular substance to get to procedure suitable to many substances is in fact what the task of law most
often is." A. BICKEL, MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 68, at 121. See id. at 127-42.
74. Id. at 24. "Better to recognize from the first that the computing principle is all
there is, ought to be, or can be." Id. at 88. In so saying, Bickel confessed the same failure he
had imputed to Frankfurter: "[h]e never achieved a rigorous general accord between judicial
supremacy and democratic theory." A. BICKEL, IDEA OF PROORESS, supra note 68, at 34.
75. J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 25.
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ness unless it concentrates on the vindication of individual consti76
tutional rights.
Choper is aligned with Ely on all key doctrinal points, though
he arrives at Ely's position by a different route. Ely would rewrite
constitutional decisions on the merits; Choper would curtail the
Court's jurisdiction. Yet, while Choper's diagnosis and prescription
are more radical, his emphasis on individual rights and the withering away of other functions actually represents the logical extension of Ely's analysis. The Court, for Choper, is not the sturdy institution capable of thwarting or at least postponing the popular
will that it is for Ely 77 but rather a more fragile body which must
be careful to husband its exhaustible capital of goodwill and respect so as to preserve its prestige and concomitant effectiveness. 8
The Court must, therefore, devote itself exclusively to its most approved and successful role: protecting the individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 9
This conclusion is the substance of the first of Choper's Four
Proposals, the Individual Rights Proposal.8 0 To this end, following
as corollary, Choper's Court would not decide constitutional disputes concerning the power of the federal government over the
states nor between coordinate branches of the federal govern76. Id. at 139-40, 167.
77. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 45-48.
78. "It is precisely to conserve its power and prestige in those cases in which it cannot
do otherwise that the Supreme Court should be made aware that each and every bold policy
decision will bring it into the political arena." Jaffe, Impromptu Remarks, 76 HAuv. L. REV.
1111, 1112 (1963). On the whole, however, it is more realistic to view the Court as Ely does:
an institution with sufficient power to forestall popular initiatives, at least temporarily.
Choper's case for the "fragility" of judicial review rests on a historical record that is necessarily so complex and multifaceted that opposite conclusions can be drawn from the same
evidence. See, e.g., Kessel, Public Perceptions of the Supreme Court, in THE IMPACT OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

193 (1969)(T. Becker, ed.)(survey of Seattle residents shows atti-

tude of majority favorable to the Court, rebutting J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 129-70). It is a
matter of historical fact that only four Supreme Court decisions have been reversed by constitutional amendment, and "the resort to a constitutional amendment rather than a simpler form of legislative action indicated the very great authority which was accorded a Supreme Court construction of the Constitution." W. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT 262
n.* (1962).
79. J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 164-68. Ely finds precedent for this protective task in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); J. ELY, supra note 3, at 85-86, but
Choper goes to the wellspring; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), J.
CHOPER,

80.

supra note 4, at 66-67.
J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 67-68.
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ment8 1 Such disputes would be in the traditional sense nonjusticiable for lack of articulable standards 82 and the Court's congenital
inability to deal with the rough-and-tumble of realpolitik. 83 More
importantly, from the viewpoint of democratic process, all interested parties retain by design an adequate say in the final distribution. No legitimate interest is or can be shut out.
These principles are embodied in the second and third proposals, called respectively the Federalism and Separation Proposals.
The Federalism Proposal relegates constitutional issues of federal
power vis-h-vis the states 84 to the political branches, i.e., Congress
and the President. The Separation (as in Powers) Proposal states
that the federal judiciary ought not to determine constitutional
questions turning on the prerogatives of the Legislature vis-a-vis
the Executive, and vice versa.8 5 Hence, from the central perspective of individual rights, it is immaterial whether the state or federal government violated established rights or whether the Congress or the Executive trespassed constitutionally protected rights.
Choper is, however, careful to leave the Court the ultimate judge of
its own bailiwick. This is the burden of the fourth and final principle, the Judicial Proposal, which leaves the Court the final arbiter
of the bounds of its Article III "judicial power. ' ' 86
While the Federalism and Separation Proposals appear to be a
startling departure from the Court's tasks, Choper's thesis is that
these proposals are consistent with the history of the Court's
demonstrated effectiveness. Choper's Court simply avoids forays
into those areas in which the Court would add little or have little
influence, those areas being where the relevant parties can adequately negotiate and protect their interests without detriment to
the individual rights guaranteed each citizen by the Constitution.
The heart of Choper's book is comprised of the two middle
proposals, which would, roughly, enact Bickel's passive virtues by
removing the Court from almost all cases, save those where indi81. Id. at 2-3.
82. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
83. J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 305-08.
84. Id. at 175 (footnote omitted). The Federalism Proposal and the Individual Rights
Proposal are presented embryonically in Choper, On the Warren Court and Judicial Review, 17 CATH. U.L. REv. 20, 39-40 (1967).
85. J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 263.
86. Id. at 382-84.
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vidual constitutional liberties were at stake. 7 The net effect of
Choper's key proposals is to extend the political question doctrine8 to all cases but those unmistakably involving individual
rights, and also to resolve the incorporation controversy89 at a
stroke.
The controversy involving the incorporation of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process clause is cut like a Gordian knot because, under Choper's
plan, it is irrelevant whether the state or federal government invaded the constitutional right at issue. If a right has been
abridged, the Court should intervene, but deciding which level of
government has the power is nonjusticiable.90 Similarly, for Choper
it is irrelevant whether the Congress or the Executive violates individual constitutional rights. If the conduct "allegedly violates individual constitutional rights-that is, those personal liberties that
are secured against all governmental abridgments, presidential or
congressional-then, in accord with the Individual Rights Proposal, the Court should intervene."" l The Separation Proposal renders nonjusticiable "only the constitutional validity of presidential
action that affects individual 'freedom' in a way identical to what
Congress could have done pursuant to its constitutionally dele87. See A. BICKEL, MORALITY

OF CONSENT, supra note

68, at 62-63 (Court should be

activist in protecting First Amendment rights); Wright, supra note 21, at 4.
88.

As definitively set forth in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), a case will be

found to present a "political question" when (1) the issue involves resolution of questions
committed by the constitutional text to a coordinate branch of government; (2) when the
question is not susceptible to resolution by judicially discoverable and manageable standards; or (3) when prudential considerations militate against judicial intervention. See L.
HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 210-16 (1972); Scharpf, Judicial Review
and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966).
89. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,
345-47 (1963)(opinion of Douglas, J.); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51-54 (1947); id.
at 61-67 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 71-75 (Black, J., dissenting); R. BERGER, supra
note 2, at 134-65; A. BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 68, at 100-02; 2 W.
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 1083-158 (1953); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporatethe Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding,2 STAN. L. REV. 5
(1949); Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
JudicialInterpretation,id. at 140.
90. J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 175-76 (emphasis in original).
91. Id. at 272. Professor Tribe went a step further in his draft constitution for the
newly-independent Marshall Islands, where he gave citizens the right to sue not only the
government but also each other for such constitutional violations as infringement of speech.
Brill, The Founding Father, ESQUIRE, Feb. 27, 1979, at 10, 12.
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gated authority."9 2 Underlying the Federalism and Separation Proposals is the idea that the Court, as a non-majoritarian institution,

is no more able than the political branches to determine areas of
competence. As Choper explains the Federalism Proposal:
Whatever the judiciary's purported or self-professed special competence
in articulating the values and defining the scope of those constitutional
clashes that declare individual rights, when the fundamental issue turns in
large measure on the relative competence of different levels of government to
deal with societal problems, the Court is no more inherently capable of correct judgment than its companion federal branches. Indeed, the judiciary
may well be less capable, given both the highly pragmatic nature of federalstate questions and the forceful representation of the states (which are directly affected by their resolution) in the national process of political
3
decisionmaking.'

Judicial review is also unnecessary, says Choper, to settle separation of powers issues: "the checks on legislative autocracy that [the
founders] contemplated exist independently of judicial supervision
of the constitutionally mandated separation of powers between the
President and Congress."" What remains is a judiciary that fits
hand in glove with Ely's renovated model: an abstentious institution in all matters save the protection of individual liberties
broadly deduced from the Bill of Rights.

HI.
A.

THE LimnTs OF PROcEss ANALYSIS

To Have Neither Force nor Will

Unlike its English counterpart, the American judiciary, at
least since 1803, is called upon to evaluate enacted legislation
against a more basic framework of legal principles, the Constitution.9 5 Thus the institution of judicial review is a logical conse92. J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 272.

93. Id. at 202-03.
94. Id. at 269.
95. In the words of a British lawyer whose surname is a rhetorical favorite of Ely's: "We
make no distinction between laws that are not fundamental or constitutional and laws that
are fundamental or constitutional, and there is no supreme law against which to test the
validity of other laws." Lester, FundamentalRights in the United Kingdom: The Law and
the British Constitution, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 337, 338 (1976). Blackstone wrote in 1765, "if
the parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no
power that can control it." 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 91.
96. Judicial review may be defined for present purposes as the power of the federal
courts to determine the constitutionality of actions of the legislative and executive branches.
See, e.g., McCleskey, Judicial Review in a Democracy: A Dissenting Opinion, 3 Hous. L.
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quence, though not the only conceivable one, of the fact that the
Constitution circumscribes the rule of the majority in setting certain courses of action beyond the reach of the populace. It is the
"fear of popular majorities," Professor Corwin wrote, "which lies at
the very basis of the whole system of judicial review, and indeed of
our entire constitutional system.

97

As Justice Jackson put it:

The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects

from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach
of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a
free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights

may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. 8

If there are irreducible areas of our system in which the majority is not to hold sway, some agency is required to interpret the
rules and declare in which specific instances this result will obtain.
"[J]udicial review, almost by definition, operates in precisely the
area where democratic theory suggests that the majority ought not
to have discretion."99 Indeed, constitutional adjudication is, in essence, the adjusting or balancing of areas of majority vis-A-vis minority discretion. That the Supreme Court is not itself a
REv. 354, 355 (1966); W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMIsAR & J. CHOPER, CONsTrrunoNAL LAW 8 (4th
ed. 1975); J. ELY, supra note 3, at 4 n.*, 240 n. 77.
97. Corwin, The Supreme Court and the FourteenthAmendment, 7 MICH. L. REv. 643,
670 (1909).
98. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). See also Whitney
v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 376 (1927)(Brandeis, J., concurring)("Recognizing the occasional
tyrannies of governing majorities, (the framers] amended the Constitution so that free
speech and assembly should be guaranteed."); Lucas v. 44th Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713,
736-37 (1964). Eventually accepting Jefferson's arguments for a Bill of Rights, Madison said:
We ought ...

to ...

declare the great rights of mankind secured under this

constitution...
If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardian of those rights;
they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the
legislative or executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment
upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution by the declaration of
rights.
1 ANNALS OF CONG. 449, 457 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1834)(Address by Rep. Madison, June 8,
1789), quoted in Mason, JudicialActivism: Old and New, 55 VA. L. Rsv. 385, 401 (1969).
99. Bishin, Judicial Review in Democratic Theory, 50 So. CAL. L. REv. 1099, 1118
(1977). For further comment on the "contradictions of Madisonian Democracy," see Brest,
The FundamentalRights Controversy: The Essential Contradictionsof Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1096-1109 (1981).
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majoritarian or representative institution is, therefore, not harmful
to its position. It follows that where the courts properly determine
whether or not the popular will, as translated into legislation, has
overrun its bounds, the courts do not, contrary to Frankfurter's
suggestion, illegitimately thwart that popular will. What appeared
to be a disadvantage to the Court's claim to democratic membership, namely its political insulation and disinterestedness, now bolsters the Court's claim to be the appropriate agency for settling
constitutional disputes.100 It is from this position of impartiality
and fairness, of dispensing equal justice under law, that the Court
has earned its place as a forum of last resort for the powerless.101
An occasional unpalatable decision does not mean judicial review is incompatible with democracy, only that the proper balance
of majority rule and majority constraint is a sensitive task requiring expertise and interaction with other constituent elements of a
democracy, not least the lay public. 102 The proper balance will additionally depend upon the social cohesion and consensus that obtains at each historical moment: the degree of trust among the segments of society coupled with traditions of respect for law and
legal institutions. It follows that this balance will vary from nation
to nation.103 To return to the transatlantic comparison, American
political institutions leave more scope to minorities than British
100. Even Justice Frankfurter, despite his fear of judges' importing their "private notions" into the Constitution, admitted that this is a realistic appraisal of the judicial role in
practice:
There is a good deal of shallow talk that the judicial robe does not change the
man within it. It does. The fact is that on the whole judges do lay aside private
views in discharging their judicial functions. This is achieved through training,
professional habits, self-discipline and that fortunate alchemy by which men are
loyal to the obligation with which they are entrusted.
Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 466 (1952)(statement of Frankfurter, J.).
101. J. PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 426 (1979); M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF
SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JunICIL REVIEw 36-37 (1966); Kurland, The Constitution
and the Tenure of FederalJudges: Some Notes from History, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 665, 667
(1969). For Ely, the Court's removal from the political arena argues against its fitness for
resolving constitutional disputes: "our moral sensors function best under the pressure of
experience." J. ELY, supra note 3, at 57 (emphasis in original). But see id. at 75 n.*. He
seems to confuse uninterested with disinterested; the Court's insulation is only from pressure, not the perception of it.
102. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE INTHE LIBERAL STATE (1980)(inviting the
Court to "police the dialogue" among citizens); Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in American Government, 66 GEo. L.J. 1191, 1229-30
(1978).
103. Bishin, supra note 99, at 1120.
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institutions which are "simplified and streamlined for majority
rule," a fact due to Britain's "political homogeneity as a people."'"
Excessive deference to legislative enactments, then, may be less
appropriate to contemporary America than to Victorian England;
Justice Frankfurter's Anglomania

05

was no coincidence.

But it is an American constitution we are expounding, one
designed for a nation increasingly characterized by a welter of interests and factions, 106 resulting in what has been called "minorities rule.

10e 7

In the vision of the framers, the freedoms associated

with democracy were to be realized by a separation or diffusion 0 8
of power so that no majority in whatever guise, whether the King
in Parliament or the House of Burgesses assembled, could tyrannize minority interests and rights. Hence, Madison's great theory

of "factions" (today we should say "interest groups") in Federalist
No. 10:
Extend the sphere [assume, that is, a large and heterogeneous democratic
society] and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it
less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be
more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in
unison with each other. 109

This may be difficult but it is not impossible; and it is why a judi104. L. LnSON, THE DEMOCRATIc CIVIZATION 579 (1964). See also Lester, supra note
95, at 339, 343.
105. See J. ELY, supra note 3, at 60; Mason, supra note 98, at 402-03. Though Frankfurter was occasionally chided for his Anglifying tendencies, e.g., in Perez v. Brownell, 356
U.S. 44, 79 (1958)(Douglas, J., dissenting from majority opinion of Frankfurter, J.), Isaiah
Berlin has wisely observed that Frankfurter's passion for things English was not snobbery
but instead reflected an admiration "for all that was sane, refined, not shoddy, civilized,
moderate, peaceful, the opposite of brutal, decent,-for the liberal and constitutional traditions that before 1914 were so dear to the hearts and imaginations especially of those
brought up in eastern or central Europe ...... I. BERLIN, PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS 89 (1980).
106. See G. McCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERIcAN DEMOCRACY (1966); Stewart,
The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667, 1712 (1975).
107. R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATI THEORY 132 (1956).
108. B. BAiLYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 55 (1967); G.
WOOD, ThE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 at 453 (1969).
109. THE FEDERALIsT No. 10, at 64 (J.Madison)(J. Cooke ed. 1961). Cf. THE FEDERALIST

No. 51, at 350-53 (J. Madison)(J. Cooke ed. 1961)(a diverse national citizenship will serve to
protect a minority group from repression by a combined majority). See also M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 1-175 (1967); Oakes, The ProperRole of the
Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights, 54 N.Y.U.L. REV. 911, 912-19 (1979); Sharp,
The ClassicalAmerican Doctrine of "The Separationof Powers," 2 U. CHL L. REv. 385, 386
(1935).
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cially enforceable Bill of Rights became part of the constitutional
plan. The judiciary, therefore, belongs to a scheme of institutions
able to counteract one another 11 0 and, hence, acts as a bulwark
against excessive legislative or executive actions.1 11 It is these two
aspects of the judicial function which Choper threatens and which
therefore constitute the two major reasons why Choper's proposals
should be more carefully considered before Congress adopts them.
1. Horizontal and Vertical Differences. First, it is arguable
that any compromise struck in the federal-state, Congressional-Executive arena affects individual rights, either obviously, by violating due process of law, or subtly, by some gradual and unforeseeable restructuring of institutional powers. Choper's rejoinder is
that it is irrelevant which level or branch had the power at issue,
hence this criticism is not ultimately "based on any direct governmental infringement of personal constitutional liberties as conventionally defined."' 1 2 Choper's indifference to the particular level or
organ of government taking the contested action, however, crucially assumes that the quality of constitutional protection is neutral as to tier and branch. In a certain percentage of cases, this
may be true enough. In other instances, however, enormously different consequences may flow from the different natures of the institutions involved. The importance of different institutions as particular sources of rights and obligations was underscored by Justice
Jackson's concurrence in the Steel Seizure Case,113 which involved
President Truman's unilateral decision to take over the nation's
steel mills in the midst of what he deemed a national emergency
during the Korean War. Concerned with the possibility of an autocratic executive usurping legislative functions and powers, Justice
Jackson wrote:
No one, perhaps not even the President, knows the limits of the power he

may seek to exert in this instance and the parties affected cannot learn the
limit of their rights. We do not know today what powers over labor or property would be claimed to flow from Government possession if we should legal-

ize it, what rights to compensation would be claimed or recognized, or on
110. B. BAILYN, supra note 108, at
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison).

273-80; G. WOOD, supra note 108, at 152-61, 452-63;

111. B. BAMYN, supra note 108, at 43, 56; Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 A.B.F. Rzs. J. 521.
112. J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 273.
113. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), discussed in J.
CHOPER,

supra note 4, at 316-27.
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what contingency it would end. With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be made
by parliamentary deliberations.114

Many important governmental powers and relationships are

now defined by statute rather than by an unadorned constitutional
provision, somewhat blunting the edge of Choper's theory. Still,

Choper relies heavily on the distinction between constitutional and
statutory adjudication, applying his Proposals only to the first
type. 115 However, it is more than likely that the general pub-

lic-after all, the source of judicial legitimacy, or conversely "fragility"-does not, as a rule, make this technical distinction.1 16 Most

of the juicy separation of powers cases turn on statutory and not
purely constitutional interpretation, so that cases which might
have been grist for Choper's mill-like Youngstown," 7 the Pentagon Papers Case,11 8 United States v. Nixon""-are justiciable and
114. 343 U.S. at 655.
115. J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 70. There are, of course, intrinsically important differences. Thus stare decisis has more force in statutory than in constitutional analysis, since in
the former Congress can easily correct the Court. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671

(1974).
116. See, e.g., H. SPIRO, GOVERNMENT BY CONSTrrUTION 217-19 (1959)(esoteric nature of
English case system contrasted with accessibility of continental codes); Greenhouse, Supreme Court, in Lull: No Murders, No Marriages,N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1980, §A, at 16, col.
1 (public confusion about the Court's work and workings). More than the general public can

be perplexed as to whether a decision rests on statutory or purely constitutional grounds. In
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), four Justices concluded that
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000 d-2000 d-6 (1976), which forbids
racially-based exclusions from federally-funded programs, applies to a state medical school
which reserved a percentage of its admissions for disadvantaged or minority applicants. 438
U.S. at 408-21 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., and Rehnquist, J.).
Five Justices concluded that Title VI did not apply to the instant facts, but only to racial
classifications employed by a state or its agencies. 438 U.S. at 281-87 (opinion of Powell, J.);
id. at 328-55 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ.). See J. ELY, supra
note 3, at 170.
117. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), explores the extent
of presidential power exercisable without congressional authorization. Had the support of
Congress been sought and obtained, the seizure in all probability would have been upheld.
See E. CoRwIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 154-58 (4th ed. 1957).
118. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), discussed in J.
CHOPER, supra note 4, at 328-29. The PentagonPapers Case upheld the right of newspapers
to publish certain classified government documents in the face of a presidential injunction.
The various opinions of the Court spotlighted the absence of congressional statutory enactments authorizing the President to enjoin such publication. 403 U.S. at 718 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 720 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 73132 (White, J., concurring); id. at 742, 746-47 (Marshall, J., concurring).
119. 418 U.S. 683 (1974), discussed in J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 336-42. In this case,
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fall outside the scope of the Separation Proposal, dissipating much
of its shock value. Additionally, anything colorably implicating individual liberties under the Bill of Rights by letter, spirit, penumbra or emanation is likewise justiciable. All that remains are cases
like Myers v. United States,120 involving issues of congressional
competency to limit the President's ability to remove the officers
he appoints to the Executive Branch (at least in the lower echelons). This is an administrative law question; not whether a power
or duty is to be exercised by one branch or another, but how best
to carry out that power or duty. Choper is right to suggest that a
case like Myers presents a question of efficiency and political expediency, questions of political judgment that, when unsupported by
121
acts of Congress, should not be justiciable.
A more formidable challenge to the Separation Proposal is offered by Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,1 22 in which
the Court upheld a statute directing the Administrator to take custody of the materials former President Nixon had accumulated
while in office and have archivists screen the materials for documents of historical, as opposed to personal, value. That the Justices reached the question of congressional encroachment upon executive autonomy is facially contrary to the Separation Proposal,
but in reality, says Choper, the case involved not two colliding
branches of government, but Congress versus a particular Chief
Executive no longer in office. Therefore, the full give and take possible between Congress and an incumbent President, which ensures
the Watergate Special Prosecutor had a subpoena issued against the President which required specified tape and documents the Special Prosecutor wanted in preparation for the
criminal trial of several presidential staff members and political supporters. Answering the
contention made by the President's counsel that jurisdiction was lacking because the matter

was an intra-branch'dispute between a subordinate and a superior officer of the Executive
Branch, the Court ruled that the Attorney General was congressionally authorized to conduct the government's criminal litigation, and the Special Prosecutor, acting pursuant to a
valid regulation promulgated by the Attorney General, was vested with "explicit power to
contest the invocation of executive privilege in the process of seeking evidence deemed relevant to the performance of these specially delegated duties." 418 U.S. at 695 (footnote
omitted).
120. 272 U.S. 52 (1926), discussed in J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 330-34.
121. See Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in DeterminingIncidental Powers of the
Presidentand of the FederalCourts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping
Clause, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 102, 113-17 (1976) (similarly concluding that Myers called
for political rather than judicial resolution).
122. 433 U.S. 425 (1977), discussed in J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 342-43.
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trustworthy resolution, is missing. 123 Nevertheless, Choper holds
that the Court should not have decided the separation of powers
question because "President Carter [the then incumbent] ...
could have directed Mr. Nixon . . . to assert executive privilege
and then defend this position as the Separation Proposal contemplates. ' 124 Even if President Carter were to take up Mr. Nixon's
fight because the former anticipated the impairment of his own
ability to discharge his duties, Choper's rationale would be susceptible to an overbroad use, subject to curtailment solely at the
hands of a potentially jealous and vindictive Congress. It allows
the President to determine what may be harmful to the Chief Executive as an institution, a branch of government, thereby snatching it from the Court's jurisdiction-which is what the claim of
"executive privilege" is all about in the first place.
Choper eventually undercuts the premises of his treatise when
he says that "whether ... the Court's substantive interpretation
of the scope of constitutionally guaranteed personal liberties
should be influenced by whichever political branch has undertaken
to affect them is . . . beyond the scope of this book."1 2 5 The inquiry, however, "is a legitimate one under the Individual Rights
Proposal."12 So Choper is hedging his bet, and quite a hedge it is.
The imposition of these four novel Proposals is designed solely to
better allow the federal judiciary to protect individual liberties secured by the Constitution,1 27 but whether they actually do so is
"beyond the scope of this book" or left for further adjudication,
under the Individual Rights Proposal, of a more traditional (if
more fragmented) sort. The litigation under the Individual Rights
Proposal that would ensue after every certiorari denial in all major
(and probably most minor) decisions involving separation of powers or federalism to ascertain whether individual liberties had been
abridged would require the courts to issue an unending stream of
constitutional environmental impact statements. This procedure
would hardly improve the current practice of considering the effect
on all constitutional rights at the time the case is litigated and
decided.
123.

J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 342.

124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

343.
329 (emphasis added). See also id. at 79, 167.
329.
2, 64, 123, 253-54.
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Just as the actions of different branches of government can
affect protected rights, so can the actions of different levels of government. Choper's fundamental assumption that nonjusticiability
should obtain because the interests of the states are adequately
represented in Congress 128 is particularly vulnerable because, unlike inter-branch conflicts, where integral institutions represent
themselves in direct conflict, the various states are "represented"
in Congress, subject to distorting political pressures and the necessity of compromise within the states' own flanks.12 9 Differing states
will have differing interests,s and a state's interests may not be
accurately depicted because of local or collegial pressures. It may
not be accurate to assume that a state's interest is monolithic and
indivisible; interest groups often transcend boundaries, clustering
around social and economic common denominators. Moreover,
state and local governments may be less sensitive to the interests
of minorities than the national government. 1 1
Consequently, Choper embraces Justice Brennan's dissent in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 82 in which the Supreme Court
held that a federal statute giving minimum-wage protection to
state and municipal employees exceeded the authority of Congress
under the Commerce Clause. Contrary to Choper's Federalism
Proposal, the Usery Court adjudicated an issue touching on the
proper bounds of federal, as opposed to state, powers. Justice
128. The Federalism Proposal does not preclude judicial inquiry into state action allegedly encroaching upon federal prerogatives, on the theory that Congress is not as well represented at the state level as is the state level in Congress. J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 175. "A
local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of the Congress, than a national
spirit will prevail in the Legislatures of the particular States." THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at
318 (J. Madison)(J. Cooke ed. 1961). The central function originally envisioned for judicial
review in connection with federalism "was the maintenance of national supremacy against
nullification or usurpation by the individual states, the national government having no part
in their composition or their councils." Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54
COLUM. L. REV. 543, 559 (1954)(footnote omitted).
129. See Tribe, UnravelingNational League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HAv. L. REV. 1065, 1071-72 (1977).
Choper considers the problem, J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 181-84, but concludes that "the
judgment of the states' congressional representatives, politically responsible to the electorate of the entire state or to districted groups therein, may fairly be relied upon." Id. at 184.
130. Wechsler, supra note 128, at 545.
131. See West Virgiiiia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1943)(Jackson,
J); Sandalow, JudicialProtection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. Rav. 1162, 1192 (1977).
132. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), discussed in J. CHopEr, supra note 4, at 217-22, 254-59.
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Brennan concluded, like Choper, that the case was nonjusticiable
because any "restraints upon exercise by Congress of its [acknowledged] plenary commerce power lie in the political process and not
in the judicial process."133 But this was not the reasoning of the
majority, which, unlike Justice Brennan, found the case justiciable.
Choper handles this by pointing out that Usery is a rare departure
from the proposed norm, being the first Supreme Court decision in
forty years to invalidate on constitutional grounds a congressional
regulation of commerce as impinging on the sovereignty of state
and local governments.134 Choper also confines the Usery deviation
to the context in which it arose, the Commerce Clause.""5 As with
the Separation Proposal, Choper recognizes the possibility that
some constitutional contours may be modified. There could be congressional regulations of "the States qua States" that "may transgress the constitutional principle of federalism, just as they may be
found to offend against constitutionally secured personal rights."13 6
133. 426 U.S. at 857; similarly id. at 876-78, discussed in J. CHoPER, supra note 4, at
221.
134. J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 254. The last invalidation under the clause was Carter
v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
135. "[T]he Usery decision is specifically limited to the reach of national power under
the commerce clause and then only in connection with direct federal regulation of 'the
States qua States."' J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 217 (footnote omitted). Giving away the
commerce clause is nonetheless a generous concession, considering the expansive judicial
readings it has received, in e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). The standard of "the States as States," 426 U.S. at 837 (emphasis in original), is likely to prove a flexible and fact-sensitive one. The Usery Court may
well have adopted a "balancing approach" that "does not outlaw federal power in areas such
as environmental protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where
state facility compliance with imposed federal standards would be essential." Id. at 856
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
136. J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 221 (footnote omitted). Here Choper parts company
with Justice Brennan, who in his Usery dissent noted that "laws within the commerce
power may not infringe individual liberties protected by the First Amendment, . . . the
Fifth Amendment,. . . or the Sixth Amendment. .. ." 426 U.S. at 858 (citations omitted).
Given the types of cases Choper says should not have been adjudicated had the Federalism
Proposal been in effect, troublesome results would be almost sure to happen. Choper's Court
would have avoided deciding the constitutional issues in: Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883) (congressional power to forbid racial discrimination in public accommodations under
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,
392 U.S. 409 (1968)(congressional power to forbid racial discrimination in housing under the
Thirteenth Amendment); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)(congressional power
under the commerce clause to prohibit interstate transportation of goods produced in factories employing child labor). J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 193-94. Small wonder that Holmes
felt the Court's power to invalidate state laws far more important than its power to strike
down acts of Congress. O.W. HOLMES, COLLEmCTmD LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920).
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The Federalism Proposal does not guarantee constitutional results,
only reasonable and fair ones:1' 7 "[T]he position is that judicial review is not the steadfast brake to be relied on to prevent the destruction of state sovereignty." 13 8 Serious infringements of individual rights are in any event subject to inquiry under the Individual
Rights Proposal,3 9 in accordance with Choper's Great Hedge. 40
More distressing and pernicious is the artificial, air-tight distinction made between states' rights and individual rights,14 1 for judicial delineation of the rights of the states as against the national
government can affect individual rights. This, in any event, seems
the most persuasive reading of Usery, for the protected activities
of "the States as States '142 in the exercise of "traditional aspects
of state sovereignty, 1 43 such as police protection and fire preven-

tion, public sanitation and recreational facilities, 144 suggest that
"state sovereignty" in Usery stands for "nothing more nor less
than the state's role of providing for the interests of its citizens in
receiving important social services. '1 45 Accordingly, a restriction on
congressional power to override state sovereignty is construable as
a fostering, not curtailing, of individual rights.
2. A Constitution Among Friends. Second, the different natures of the different organs of government, coupled with the
knowledge that they have equal powers vis-a-vis the individual,
may mean that elected officials can safely indulge in logrolling, or
trading their votes for expedient purposes. Choper's Separation
Proposal, which would in effect allow an exchange of powers between Congress and the President, permits the exchange of responsibility from one branch to the other, so that some actions might
be less openly debated in, for instance, the Executive branch. In
exchange for assuming the onus, the Executive might exact the
performance of a politically unpleasant chore-e.g., manipulation
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 222.
Id. at 221.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 125-27 supra.
J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 193, 221.
426 U.S. at 845.
Id. at 849.

144. Id. at 846-47, 851.
145. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1172 (1977). See also id. at 1180,
1184. "This language may be read to suggest the existence of protected expectations-of
rights-to basic government services." Tribe, supra note 129, at 1076.
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of defense expenditure increases-from Congress. This is, of
course, a stake to the heart for the type of representative,
majoritarian democracy which for Choper is threatened by the
Court. What should certainly be avoided is the philosophy of
George Washington Plunkitt, the Tammany boss who was fond of
asking, "What's the Constitution among friends? ' 146 (or in the
Nixon corollary, among enemies).
A congressman and his legislative assistant 147 tracing the fate
of major bills during a session of Congress found that the Constitution "is a sometimes thing."" 4 By that they meant both chambers
of Congress "contain members who cheerfully put off on the courts
most if not all of the responsibility for squaring the statute with
the Constitution." ' This palming-off of responsibility can take
the form of plain horse-trading 1 0 ("I kept my part of the bargain,
but unfortunately the Court ruled the statute unconstitutional") or
a high-minded desire to do what seems right and allow for possible
setbacks at the hands of judges.1 51
The Court combines these two functions of scapegoat and umpire to become a mediator, buffer, or safety-valve. Constitutional
debate in the legislative chambers, specifically, knowledge that
there are rules circumscribing congressional authority, facilitates
coordination among the branches and averts confrontation.15 2
Choper appreciates this insight1 53 but finds in the abdication
of political responsibility by Congress an argument for the ineffectiveness of judicial review. 15 ' Since Congress passes the buck to the
Court, which in turn sustains almost anything Congress enacts,
says Choper, judicial rubberstamping by repeated validation will
146. Quoted in W. RioRDON, PLUNKrTT OF TAMMANY HAL. 13 (1963 ed.).
147. Mikva & Lundy, The 91st Congress and the Constitution, 38 U. Cu. L. REv. 449
(1971).
148. Id. at 449.
149. Id. at 497.
150. In yielding to pressure to vote for bills they had misgivings about, members of
Congress most often expressed the view that "if it is unconstitutional, that is what we have
a court for." Id. at 474. See also Ely & Tribe, Let There Be Life, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1981,
§A, at 17, col. 4 (idea behind scheme to statutorily overrule Court's abortion decision "is to
score points with the [anti-abortion] constituency at the expense of the courts, which, as the
[sponsoring] senator well knows, will have no choice but to strike the statute down").
151. See Mikva & Lundy, supra note 147, at 483.
152. Id. at 498.
153. J. CHOPSR, supra note 4, at 224-27.
154. Id. at 227.
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only encourage further curtailment of states' rights. 5 5 To Choper,
this perversely justifies judicial abstention.
It may be, as sanguine Thayerites might say, that a pruneddown Court would not lead to greater legislative abuse of rights,
but rather to a mature sense of legislative responsibility and restraint. Yet the national and international traumas since Thayer's
time are, at best, mute on this point and frequently suggest the
contrary, truly a return to a Constitution among friends. Perhaps
in a real crisis-wholesale mutilation of constitutional rights
amounting to revolution or coup d'etat-the courts will be little
more than straws in the wind, 15 6 but that hardly justifies the placing in peacetime of altogether too much reliance on the Congress
and the Executive to be fair-and not even fair, as it turns out, but
merely fair enough.
B. A Critique of Pure Process

In the absence of further criteria, a process-oriented theory
simply describes in broad outline why certain outcomes are unfair,
without specifying what constitutes an unfair practice. 1 7 To some

extent this is as it should be, to allow play at the joints in daily
operation. When, however, Ely doubts whether "I'd know a dis-

crete and insular minority if I saw one,"158 the theory grows tenuous. A scheme recognizing only process rights ignores other equally

well-established rights, or offers stilted justification for those
rights. 15e Chief Justice Warren observed that if Reynolds v. Sims'6 0
155. Id.
156. See J. CHOPER, supra note 4, at 222. See also A. BIcKEL, MoRALrrY OF CONSENT,
supra note 68, at 60 ("law can never make us as secure as we are when we do not need it.
Those freedoms which are neither challenged nor defined are the most secure"); Frankfurter, John Marshall and the JudicialFunction, 69 HAv. L. REV. 217, 235-36 (1955); W.
DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 259 (1956); THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 580 (A. Hamilton)(J.
Cooke ed. 1961).
157. Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education:Political Responsibility and
the JudicialRole, 42 U. Cm. L. Rav. 653, 655 (1975); Goodpaster, supra note 21, at 494. See
Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940)(equal protection clause guarantee does not represent "disembodied equality," and "does not require things which are different in fact or
opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same").
158. Ely, supra note 57, at 935; cf. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 657
(1973)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistenceof Process-BasedConstitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1073-74 (1980).
159. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 178-79 (constitutional right to travel facilitates relocating
in communities which may be more politically compatible). See note 205, infra.
160. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). In Reynolds, the Equal Protection Clause, which requires sub-
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had been decided before 1954, Brown v. Board of Education'e I
would have been' 16 unnecessary,
a claim Ely justifiably regarded as
2
"oversimplified.

Pure process as a theory of the Constitution is either inadequate or disingenuous. It is inadequate because, taken on its face,
it may command judges to enforce participatory rights, but does
not say how to balance these against other, equally participatory
individual rights.163 It is disingenuous because, if taken for the results Ely and other New Process scholars desire, under the guise of
neutral, process-not-substance adjudication, it is the expansive
readings of the Warren era1 ' that are surreptitiously favored. 6 5
stantially equal legislative representation for all citizens in a state, was found violated by an
Alabama apportionment scheme that weighted votes differently according to where citizens
happened to reside.
161. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
162. Ely, The Chief, 88 HARv. L. REV. 11, 12 (1974).
163. See generally, Tribe, supra note 158. In a recent case, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 1725 (1976), which prohibits the deposit of unstamped
"mailable matter" in a letter box designated for use by the postal service. United States
Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 101 S. Ct. 2676 (1981). When the appellee, which regularly placed unstamped notices in private letter boxes, was told it was violating the statute and subject to a fine, it brought suit charging violation of its rights to freedom of speech and press. Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court held that a letter box
approved for mail delivery by the Postal Service is part of the Postal Service's nationwide
system for distribution of mail. The customer in effect consents to the applicable regulations
of the Postal Service, and "[tihere is neither historical nor constitutional support for the
characterization of a letter box as a public forum" open to all comers. 101 S. Ct. at 2684.
Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgment only, argued that a letter box was a public
forum since it is used to communicate ideas, but concluded that the statute was constitutional "because it is a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation." Id. at 2688. Justice
White, also concurring, reasoned that the statute was justified by the government's interest
in defraying the operating expenses of the Postal Service. Hence it was unnecessary to decide the time-place-manner or public forum issues. Id. at 2691. Justice Marshall, in dissent,
averred that the Postal Service is indeed a public forum, and that the statute did deny
appellee's First Amendment rights. Id. at 2694-95. Justice Stevens, also dissenting, took the
position that a "mailbox is private property, it is not a public forum to which the owner
must grant access;" accordingly, the owner should be allowed to determine whether to permit unstamped mail to be placed in it. Id. at 2697.
164. "I shall be suggesting later in the book of which this is a part that the correction of
. . . problems of inequitable distribution is what judicial review ought in large measure to
be about." Ely, ConstitutionalInterpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 IND. L.J.
399, 406 n.29 (1978), revised and reprinted as chapters 1-2 of J. ELY, supra note 3. "The
courts must stand ready to intervene when no other forum is available for the vindication of
fundamental rights-this is the high mission of the American judiciary." Tribe, Seven Pluralist Fallacies:In Defense of the Adversary Process-A Reply to Justice Rehnquist, 33 U.
MIAMI L. Rav. 43, 56-57 (1978). Cf. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 245 (1964)(opinion of
Douglas, J.).
165. The process umbrella can therefore include a non-activist wing, the program of
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Exclusive focus on procedural regularity is compatible with
great injustice;""8 Kafka showed that. "In Hell," Grant Gilmore has

noted-concluded--"there will be nothing but law, and due process will be meticulously observed."1' 8 7 Dean Auerbach has made
this plain in his critique of Professor Bickel's attempt to salvage
the integrity of law and lawyers from the morass of Watergate. 6 8
The legal order, Bickel argued, was susceptible to causes pursued
with passionate intensity; activism was inherently destructive,
whether it was activism in protest of Vietnam or propping up the
Nixon presidency; extremism in defense of ideology, left or right,
was a vice.16 Legal morality, to survive, required support from an-

other source, and the "highest morality," Bickel concluded, "almost always is the morality of process. "170 Auerbach sees the potential for recourse to process as an abdication
responsibility:
This was legalism with a vengeance ....

of moral

Bickel rested his argument

upon the ostensible separation of process from substance and the presumed
independence of law from policy and power-precepts that defined professional thought in the twentieth century. But it was precisely the failure to
relate process to purpose, or law to justice, that elicited serious doubts about
Bickel's kind of legal authority. Critics understood, if Bickel did not, how
tenaciously the legal order had aligned itself with certain moral imperatives
(power and money) at the expense of others, all the while denying that it did
so. The notion that process could be divorced from substance was a fiction
proclaimed by the philosophers of legalism. The preference for process over
purpose-and justice-was the problem, not the solution.
The authority of the legal order cannot exist independently of other
moral values. Once function supersedes purpose, the legal order drifts rudderless on a sea of moral relativism, inevitably blown by the strongest winds
of wealth, power, and politics. The morality of process can only be justified as
which is described in the title of an article by Philip Kurland, The Court Should Decide
Less and Explain More, in THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 228 (L. Levy ed.
1972). See also Bork, supra note 13; Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal
Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. CT. REv. 41.
166. L. TRmBE, supra note 21, at 915-16. See also Dickman, An Outline of Nazi Civil
Law, 15 Miss. L.J. 127 (1943).
167. G. GILMoRE, THE AGES OF AmRICAN LAW 111 (1977). As one of Vince Lombardi's
Green Bay Packers said of the coach, "He's fair. He treats us all the same-like dogs."
Quoted in N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1970, at 24, col. 1.
168. Auerbach, The Legal Profession After Watergate, 22 WAYNE L. REv. 1287 (1976).
169. Bickel, Watergate and the Legal Order, 57 COMMENTARY 19 (1974), revised and
reprinted in A. BicKEL, MoRALrry OF CONSENT, supra note 18, at 91-123 (page citation to
COMMENTARY).

170. Bickel, supra note 169, at 25, quoted in Auerbach, supra note 168, at 1291.
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the highest morality if the citizenry is convinced that it is a fair process
which produces substantively fair results. Too many events associated with
Watergate destroyed that belief. Consequently, deprived of external nourishment to give credence to its claim of fairness, the stability of the legal order
17
deteriorated. 1

What is Ely's answer to all this? In a footnote7 2 he writes that
if political participation is considered to be also a "value," it is still
different because value imposition generally implies holding certain goods or outcomes to be so important that they must be preserved to withstand whatever happens in the political arena. Participational orientation, however, "denotes a form of review that
concerns itself with how decisions effecting value choices and distributing the resultant costs and benefits are made ... .""7s If certain decisional procedures are conceded as not just another value
judges can impose, but nonetheless can be "valued" for their own
sake, the argument is that the Court should pursue these participational "values" because "those are the 'values' (1) with which
our Constitution has preeminently and most successfully concerned itself, (2) whose 'imposition' is not incompatible with, but
on the contrary supports, the American system of representative
democracy, and (3) that courts set apart from the political process

are uniquely situated to 'impose.'

"174

In other words, true process adjudication avoids value imposition by merely ensuring that the substantive choices made elsewhere are carried out. This theory assumes that in deciding what
the intent and scope of the legislation, constitutional clause, or
common-law rule was, and how best to carry it out, requires no
choice; no extracting of implicit values to override other interpretations. "It is, then," as Judge Oakes has reminded us, "impossible
in the process of constitutional adjudication not to apply certain
basic principles that involve value choices. '175 The dichotomy between value imposition and mere procedural supervision is a false
171. Auerbach, supra note 168, at 1291. See also M. HoRwrrz, THE TRmSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 266 (1977)("the paramount social condition that is necessary
for legal formalism to flourish in a society is for the powerful groups in that society to have
a great interest in disguising and suppressing the inevitably political and redistributive
functions of law"); Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEG. STUD. 351, 378 (1973).
172. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 75 n.*.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Oakes, supra note 109, at 930.
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one: to make a decision between competing alternatives is to define
a value upheld and a value rejected. 17 8 Likewise, Ely's attempt to
drive an entering wedge between garden-variety values that unenlightened judges impose every day and "valuing" procedure for its
own sake is a dead end. Preference for a procedure of a special
kind, or for procedural safeguards in general, most certainly does
bespeak a value which can inform decisions as much as any other
"value" Ely chooses to recognize, a commitment to a certain type
of relationship between citizen and government. 17 7 More cynically,
regulation of procedure can mean determination of outcome. 178
The indictments against the King in the Declaration of Independence are, after all, mostly "procedural"-charging maladministration of the laws, abuse of legislatures, and mistreatment of the judiciary-yet they were sufficient to justify a revolution.
The nature of the minority ostensibly to be protected may also
be factually complex. Disputes such as those concerning racial
176. Wechsler, supra note 12, at 15. The interchangeability of process and value interpretations is illustrated by a couple of Ely's least favorite fundamental value cases, Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407
(1857). See Ely, Toward a Representation-ReinforcingMode of JudicialReview, 37 MD. L.
REv. 451, 484 n. 116 (1978), revised and reprinted as chapter 4 of J. ELY, supra note 3.
Lochner, it will be remembered, professed to offer greater individual liberty of contract as
against a state police power found too intrusive. 198 U.S. at 56-57. (Lochner thus actually
presents a problem of individual autonomy to which Ely's theory, strictly speaking, is not
addressed.) Chief Justice Taney in Dred Scott did not even find the Constitution sufficiently open-ended to allow process theory to plug the gap, ruling against Scott on the
ground that blacks were not recognized as citizens at the time the Constitution was ratified,
i.e., as of the time the instrument is presumed to speak. 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 407. Process
theory can hence accommodate, or account for, even the all-time heinous decisions.
177. This was Justice Frankfurter's point when he wrote:
the safeguards of "due process of law" and "the equal protection of the laws"
summarize the history of freedom of English-speaking peoples running back to
Magna Carta and reflected in the constitutional development of our people. The
history of American freedom is, in no small measure, the history of procedure.
Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 413-14 (1945)(Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); United States v.
Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 581-82 (2d Cir. 1956)(Frank, J., dissenting in part), rev'd on other
grounds, 353 U.S. 391 (1957)(procedural right of freedom from unreasonable search is part
of "substantive" right of privacy); Summers, Evaluatingand Improving Legal Processes-A
Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1974).
178. See, e.g., Orren, Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the Federal Courts,
70 Am.POL. ScL REv. 723 (1976)(Supreme Court's evolving standing doctrine instrumental
in bestowing on private groups increasing power to determine public policy); Galanter, Why
the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y
REv. 95 (1974)(social rules generally serve the interests of those elites most responsible for
their enactment and administration).
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preference policies rarely involve a monolithic majority versus a
monolithic minority, but generally a coalition of minorities on both
sides.1 79 This weighs heavily against Ely's justification for judicial
furtherance of affirmative action programs, which is simply that
nothing prevents a majority from discriminating against itself.1 80
On both the winning and losing sides interests will differ and diverge: not every component of the "winner" will equally win, nor
will every segment of the other side equally lose. Ely, therefore,
cannot blandly maintain that discrimination in favor of one group
is not necessarily discrimination against another.18 1 Selection of
the forum for resolution is also significant, if any consensus, based
on fair representation, is to be claimed: a local school board will
often not be as inclusive of vying factions as a state legislature,
or-after some tentative national consensus has emerged-the
Congress.18 2 "Extend the sphere," ss said Madison.
So Ely's new, improved constitutional theory involves-horribile dictu-substantive values and, hence, policy
choices. 8 That it was inevitable does not tell against Ely's doctrine; that it was not squarely faced does. Even if the basic premises of a "participation-oriented" democracy could be completely
set out,1 85 judges could and would still disagree about how and
179. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 170-71; Ely, The Constitutionalityof Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 723, 727 (1974).
180. See sources cited notes 106-07 supra.
181. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 171-72.
182. Sandalow, supra note 157, at 700-02; see Ely, supra note 179, at 741 ("Measures
that favor racial minorities pose a difficult moral question that should . . .be left to the
states"). See generally Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEE. L. REV. 195, 219-20
(1976).
183. TH FEDERALIST. No. 10, at 64 (J. Madison)(J. Cooke ed. 1961).
184. Ralph Waldo Emerson meant something similar when he wrote that "[L]aw is only
a memorandum." R. EMERSON, Politics, in THE COMPLETE EssAYs AND OTHER WRITINGS OF
RALPH WALDO EmER ON 422, 423 (B. Atkinson ed. 1940). See-also E. GOFFMAN, AsYLuMs 174
(1961)("behind each contract there are non-contractual assumptions about the character of
the participants")(citing E. DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND Civm Mom
As 171-220
(Cornelia Brookfield trans. 1957); G. TuLnoCK, THE LOGIC OF THE LAW 47 (1971). See generally R. COVER & 0. FISS, THE STRUCTURE OF PROcEnuPn 47-104 (1979)(on independence and
interdependence of substance and process); Grey, Procedural Fairness and Substantive
Rights, in Nomos XVIII: DuE PROCESS 182 (J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1977)(degree of
procedural formality an evaluative measure of the importance of the entitlement contested);
Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in ProceduralDue Process, in id. at 126 (requirements of due process based on intrinsically procedural values of revelation and
participation).
185. See Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Inter-
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when to apply them in specific cases. 186 Weighing competing values
is what a judge does in, say, the "sound truck" cases, 18 7 where the
right to free expression is pitted against the right to privacy. 8 Hierarchies and priorities inevitably emerge. No longer would the
question be what rights are "fundamental," perhaps, but its
equivalent would be asked: what rights are essential to the full and
free operation of "the process by which the laws that govern society are made."1 89 Whenever a judge-or anybody-applies rules to
specific situations, choices inescapably are made. "We do not always agree," said Chief Justice Warren on his departure from the
Court. "It is not likely ever, with human nature as it is, for nine
men to agree always on the most important and controversial
things of life." 9 0 In a collegial tribunal there will be different
members reasoning from different world views based upon necessarily incompatible starting axioms. Hence, Ely's jape that decisions
will be based on the relative popularity of various social and ecopretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502, 515-18 (1964)(judges can dispute the degree of openendedness of particular constitutional clauses); Munzer & Nickel, Does the Constitution
Mean What It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. Rv.1029, 1050-51 (1977)(elasticity of constitutional provisions); Sandalow, ConstitutionalInterpretation,79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1050
(1981) (similar).
186. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 97-117
(1973)(Marshall, J., dissenting)(on problem of assigning definite weight to various potential
"fundamental interests"); Oakes, supra note 109, at 930; Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist?
The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80 HARv.L. REV. 986, 999 (1967)("even among the
rights specified in the Bill of Rights the judge ... must choose first whether the right is
fundamental").
187. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 110. The cases include: Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949), and Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
188. Ely tacitly concedes this in sketching the impermissible reasons for disadvantaging
a group, i.e., what values are not favored. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 136-45. See generally
Baker, Neutrality, Process, and Rationality: Flawed Interpretations of Equal Protection,
58 Tax. L. REv. 1029, 1048 (1980); Brest, The Substance of Process,42 OHio ST.L.J. 131,
140-41 (1981); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79
YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). The language of impermissible disadvantaging, i.e., of prejudice, is
inherent in the language of footnote 4 itself.
189. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 74. The extending of participatory rights alone is not necessarily more "democratic." Granting the vote to an entire, community on issues such as
property taxes or school subsidies dilutes the voice of those most directly affected by the
outcome of the election. Ely fails to show when and why the franchise should be expanded
or withheld. Estreicher, Book Review, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 547, 572-73 (1981).
190. Retirement of Mr. Chief Justice Warren, 395 U.S. xi (1969). "Disagreement on the
complex issues that come before the Court is the norm," the present Chief Justice has written, eulogizing a colleague of whom this would particularly have been the case. Burger, Tribute to William 0. Douglas, 93 Hxv. L. REv. 1401, 1401 (1980).
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nomic theories--"we like Rawls, you like Nozick. We win, 63" 1 1-expresses a truth and is not quite as damaging as he
thinks.19 2 By the same token, those critics who argue that Ely's

theory of judicial review is faulty because it would permit Lochner
v. New York"1 3 or some other discredited decision,"" similarly fail
to realize that an overarching theory can provide a general orientation, but need not supply specific results for specific times and
conditions.9 As Ely knows, "the implications of any non-trivial
theory will be open to debate."196
Ely recognizes the possibility of controversy, that "[t]he elaboration of a representation-reinforcing theory of judicial review
could go many ways, 197 and, therefore, that some kind of pivotal
value judgments exist. He even compares his theory of judicial review to antitrust concepts, meaning that intervention is justified
only when the relevant market, "in our case the political market, is
systemically malfunctioning."198 The history of antitrust law in
this country should be sufficient proof of the fluctuating, disputable nature of the standards involved.
So to firm up rights as important as the freedom of expression,199 Ely would do away with tests like "clear and present dan191. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 58. The references are to J. RAwLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971) (defending interventionist welfare state); and R. NOZICK,.ANARcHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA
(1974)(advocating limited "night watchman" state).
192. As Ely's book went to press, someone suggested almost exactly that. Nowak, Foreword: Evaluating the Work of New LibertarianSupreme Court, 7 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q.
263 (1980)(contending that the differences between the Warren and Burger Courts may be
understood in terms of the Warren Court's adherence to Rawlsian principles and the Burger
Court's following the axioms of Nozick).
193. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
194. Taylor, Due Process Under Review, N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1980, § 7, at 11, col 2;
Grodin, (Book Review), NAT'L L.J., Aug. 4, 1980, at 67, col. 1; Tushnet, Darkness on the
Edge of Town: The Contributionsof John HartEly to ConstitutionalTheory, 89 YALE L.J.
1037, 1055 n.74 (1980). Cf. Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 695, 700 (courts are neither equipped nor authorized to make
political or sociological decisions).
195. R.

CRAWSHAY-WILLIAMS, METHODS AND CRITERIA OF REASONING

195 (1957)(deci-

sions may be logically arbitrary but sociologically unarbitrary); Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Harvard,13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rxv. 117, 129 (1978).
196. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 62 (emphasis in original). See id. at 186 n.10.
197. Id. at 181.
198. Id. at 102-03.
199. Ely apparently includes all speech, not just the explicitly political kind most compatible with his theory.
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ger"200 and varieties thereof (when content alone and not conduct
is at issue) because they, in effect, weigh the facts of an individual
case against the current political climate. 20 1 Ely's modified absolu-

tist First Amendment theory "immunizes all expression save that
20 2
which falls within a few clearly and narrowly defined categories.

1

What Ely is really doing is setting up a Wechslerian scheme of
principled enforcement of First Amendment rights, in hopes of
shielding expression during parlous times to come. Ely's categories
afford protection by supplying "reasons that in their generality
and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved."203 The categories will be blurred around the edges, as Ely
realizes,204 but such categories "build protective barriers around
free expression as secure as words can make them.

' 20

Workable neutral principles must nevertheless have some content and be derivable from a source specific enough to focus and
delimit judicial authority. This is the role footnote four plays for
Ely when the Constitution is too open-textured (or open-textured
enough). It is Ely's argument against the troubleshooting use to
which substantive due process has been put,206 but it is forsaken
when Ely sanctions a thoroughly activist judicial role in the areas
of voting rights and malapportionment.0 7 In these cases, Ely
would discourage exclusive reliance on the Equal Protection Clause
200. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
201. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 112.
202. Id. at 110 (emphasis deleted).
203. Wechsler, supra note 12, at 19. Ely faulted neutral principles for lacking substance; in effect, something to be neutral about. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 55, 59; cf. L. TRIfE,
supra note 21, at 1137 (neutral principles valuable only when they result in beneficial
human realities). Ely's mature process thinking fulfills that theory by furnishing it content
inspired by footnote 4. Ely, Democracy and the Right to be Different, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rv.
397, 398-99 n.4 (1981).
204. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 112, 231 n.14.
205. Id. at 116. See Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, UnnaturalLaw, 1979 DuKE L.J. 1229
(on tension between desire for unambiguous, transcedent propositions of right and wrong
and need for freely decided rules of law). Ironically, the effect of Ely's theory would be to
abridge First Amendment freedoms since protection would extend only to explicitly political
expression, only along the lines advocated by Bork, supra note 13, at 20. See National Ass'n
of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 288 n.2 (1974)(Douglas, J., concurring)(rejecting
the "emasculative reading of the First Amendment" that only political speech is protected);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)(freedom of expression must embrace all issues); Goodpaster, supra note 21, at 490.
206. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 18.
207. Id. at 124-25.
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in favor of the Republican Form, or Guarantee, Clause.20 8 There

are two reasons for this reliance: justifications tendered and accepted under the Equal Protection Clause have been too weak, 20
and the integration of minorities in the governing process under
the one-person-one-vote doctrine is most comfortably assigned to
the Republican Form Clause, perhaps in tandem with the Equal
Protection Clause.210
Yet the Republican Form Clause is even more open-ended
than the Equal Protection Clause, which at least describes an intelligible formal relationship. The Republican Form Clause may
possibly have had some clearly-defined and hence justiciable
meaning in the 18th century,211 but surely today it is opaque.2
is free to create
Thus loosed from principled moorings, the Court
213
the political arrangements it finds satisfactory.
Ely provides a similarly literalist reading of the Ninth Amendment, which provides that "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution,
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people. 2 1 4 Ely concludes that "the Ninth Amend-

ment was intended to signal the existence of federal constitutional
rights beyond those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, 21 5 and his argument is that the Court should more vigorously

invoke this Amendment as a source of individual rights rather than
208. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §4, cl. 1, provides: "The United States shall guarantee to every
See C. BLACK, supra note 21, at
State in this Union a republican form of government ....
64.
209. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 121-22.
210. Id. at 122.
211. Ely admits that to some of the framers the Republican Form Clause may have
meant only that the government will not be a monarchy. Id. at 123. See W. WIECEK, THE
GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTrruTION, 42-49 (1979); Note, Taking FederalismSeriously: Limiting State Acceptance of National Grants, 90 YALE L.J. 1694, 1711 (1981).
212. "[IThe Supreme Court has wisely regarded as beyond its competence the enforcement of the constitutional provision guaranteeing to the states a republican form of government. A court acting as such can neither write a constitution nor undertake a general managerial supervison of its administration." L. FULLER, TiE MoF.ALrry OF LAW 178 (rev. ed.
1969). See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217-32
(1962) (rejecting the Guarantee Clause as a basis for adjudicating malapportionment
claims).
213. See generally Kurland, supra note 18, at 149-57; Leedes, The Supreme Court
Mess, 57 Tix. L. Rnv. 1361, 1422-25, 1427-29, 1435-37 (1979); Note, United Jewish Organizations v. Carey and the Need to Recognize Aggregate Voting Rights, 87 YALE L.J. 571
(1978).
214. U.S. CONsT. Amend. IX.
216. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 68.
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pulling the camel of substantive rights through the needle's eye of
the Due Process clauses.216 Ely's reading of the Amendment is
designed to provide principled judicial enforcement of constitutional rights,217 as opposed to "textually untethered substantive review""" which transforms the courts into legislatures-cum-oversight committees.
Yet, while inveighing against the conventional wisdom that
the Ninth Amendment is to the body politic what the appendix is
to the body physical, Ely fails to come to terms with the different,
eighteenth century world of the Ninth Amendment, 21 a relatively

socially homogeneous world of a common English heritage where
rights did not have to be enumerated just because everyone more
or less knew what they were. 220 After two centuries of immigration,

urbanization,

and

secularization,

this

consensus

has

dis-

integrated: 22 1 when the Justices of the Supreme Court cannot agree

on when and whether the Ninth Amendment applies, 222 and one
Justice has confessed outright that the rights contained or preserved in the Ninth Amendment "are still a mystery to me,1223
then it is safe to say that the communal values which sustained
216. Id. at 33. See also C. BLACK, supra note 21, at 43.
217. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 39. "Perhaps the ninth amendment argument gives some
satisfaction to Justices who have a sense of uneasiness about going outside the Constitution
in protecting certain kinds of rights and helps to support further the illusion of objectivity."
Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries,Emanations, Things Fundamental and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MICH. L. Rnv. 235, 254 (1965).
218. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 189 n.13.
219. The Ninth Amendment, like the Declaration of Independence, "is written in the
lost language of the Enlightenment." G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA xiv (1978). See id. at
259; G. WOOD, supra note 108, at viii.
220. See B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN NINTH AMENDMENT 7, 19-20 (1955); Kelly, Clio
and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT. REv. 119, 154-55. See also Robertson v.
Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1897) (Bill of Rights was "not intended to lay down any novel
principles of government, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which
we had inherited from our English ancestors"); Weimer v. Bunbury, 30 Mich. 201, 214

(1874) (similar).
221. R. WEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER (1967); C. DEGLER, OUT OF OUR PAST 238-337
(1959); F. ALLEN, THE BIG CHANGE (1952); R. MORGAN, THE POLITICS OF RELIGIOUS CONFLICT
20-21 (2d ed. 1980).
222. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)(striking down state statute for.
bidding use of contraceptives as violative of constitutional right to marital privacy; majority
opinion based result on the "penumbra" of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, while
the concurrence of Goldberg, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Brennan, J., found support in
the language and history of the Ninth Amendment).
223.

(1955).
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unwritten rights have vanished simultaneously with the possibility
of principled adjudication thereunder.2 2 ' Indeed, a leading contemporary apologist for the Ninth Amendment contends that it is

functionally a presumption for limited governmental powers and
not a direct source of rights.2 25 It is, nonetheless, important in the

Constitution's scheme as a declaration of principle or statement of
policy, but this status does not rise to Ely's argued role as generative source of rights.2 2 Justice Joseph Story, barely a generation
removed from the framers and appointed to the Supreme Court by
President Madison, subscribed to this presumptive, or declaratory,

view. The Ninth Amendment, he wrote in his commentary on the
224. Ely points out that the state constitutions drafted over the next century included
replicas of the Ninth Amendment. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 203-04 n.87. This does not, however, gainsay the observation as to the federal Constitution. Smaller communities, being
more homogeneous, would have shared practices and understandings difficult to reproduce
across a continent. This is why the states have been allowed to experiment with their social
and economic problems. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921)(Hohmes, J., dissenting);
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)(Brandeis, J., dissenting); Young v.
American Mini-Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976). In this light the problem of federalism is
that of finding the best compromise between the efficiency (but conformity) of relatively
homogeneous communities and the freedom (but unwieldiness) of the larger, more diverse
entity. R. DAHL & E. Tur, SIZE AND DEmocRAcY (1973).
225. Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights... Retained by the People"?, 37 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 787, 812 (1962). "The Ninth Amendment obviously does not create federally enforceable rights." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 210 (1973)(Douglas, J., concurring). See also Barger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CoRNmL L. REv. 1 (1980).
226. The importance of specific written constitutional guarantees to a system of judicial
review is discussed in a paper by Edmond Cahn, The ParchmentBarriers, 32 AM. SCHOLAR
21 (Winter 1962-63), reprinted in CONFRONNG INJUSTICE 104 (L. Cahn ed. 1962). A text,
says Calm, anchors a judge's decision to a standard whereby all can ascertain whether the
judge has decided aright. Id. at 34-35. "Without an authoritative text the modem democratic judge may or may not be willing to overrule an earlier judicial decision; he will certainly decline to overrule or annul a legislative decision." Id. at 34 (emphasis in original).
See also Lester, supra note 95, at 343-45 (contending that as Britain becomes less homogeneous it increasingly needs a justiciable Bill of Rights). See generally Shapira, The Status
of FundamentalIndividual Rights in the Absence of a Written Constitution, 9 ISRAUn L.
REv. 497 (1974); Denenberg, British Are Once Again Talking Up a Bill of Rights, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 20, 1977, § 4, at 2, col. 3.
This is why the competition to the Ninth Amendment as a source of individual rights is
a specific clause of the Constitution, no matter how wrested from its original signification.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973)(citing parallel reliance for the right of privacy by the Court on Fourteenth Amendments Due Process Clause and that of the district
court below on the Ninth Amendment); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 239
(1971)(Douglas, J., dissenting)(citing penumbra of specific amendments as source of rights
alternative to the Ninth Amendment). See generally Gifford, Decisions, Decisional Referents, and Administrative Justice, 37 LAw & CoNTEM . PRon. 3, 7-8 (1972)(on "core" and
"penumbra" meanings). Littera scripta manet, wrote Horace, the written word remains.
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Constitution, "was manifestly introduced to prevent any perverse
or ingenious misapplication of the well known maxim, that an affirmation in particular cases implies a negation in all others; and, 6
converso, that a negation in particular cases implies an affirmation
7
in all others.

'22

More fundamentally, the Ninth Amendment's scope is symptomatic of a more profound and uncomfortable problem for constitutional theorists. Rules can change not only in meaning but also
in function, as circumstances change: 22 8 an unambiguous rule is an
untested rule. As new priorities emerge in American society, it is
understandable that they find their way into the Constitution. To
a nation leaving behind laissez-faire notions of limited government
and embracing an affirmative, interventionist government,2 ' the
Constitution, which at its inception may have served to limit governmental powers for the preservation of individual rights which
everyone could identify, by the twentieth century could legitimately be seen as a grant of rights and hence a mandate for the
government to act. 3 0 "Indeed," said a state court in the hour of
the New Deal's triumph, "the inalienable rights of the individual
are not what they used to be.

' 23 1

In this way any function the

Ninth Amendment may have had was taken up by expansive readings of a specific constitutional text. At the turn of the century the
first Justice Harlan wrote: "The Constitution which enumerates
227.

3 J.

STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

751-52 (1st

ed. Cambridge 1833).
228. As one study notes:
[W]e need to be aware that rules may have latent as well as manifest functions,
that they often have unforeseen consequences, that a rule may be serving a different function from that which was originally intended when it was created, and
that some rules are, as judged by the standards of the moment, pointless or
positively disfunctional or counter-productive. Moreover, there may be no clear
consensus about one or more of these matters and this too may be a source of
perplexity.
W. TwINING & D. MIERs, How TO Do THINGS wIH RULES 65-66 (1976)(emphasis in original,
footnote omitted). See also R. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURES (1967).

229. See, e.g., DAvis, Veterans' Benefits, Judicial Review, and the Constitutional
Problems of "Positive"Government, 39 IND. L.J. 183 (1964); Henkin, Rights: American and
Human, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 405, 419 (1979).

230. See, e.g., Miller, Toward a Concept of the ConstitutionalDuty, 1968 Sup. CT.REv.
199; Cox, Foreword: ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80
HARv. L. REv. 91 (1966); Karst & Horowitz, supra note 23, at 65-78; Michelman, Foreword:
On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7 (1969).
231. West Brothers Brick Co. v. Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 283, 192 S.E. 881, 886 (1937).
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the powers committed to the nation for objects of interest to the
people of all the States should not.

. .

be subjected to an interpre-

and narrow, that those objects cannot be
tation so rigid, 3technical,
2
accomplished.

'2

The dynamic nature of the Constitution as illustrated by the
rise and fall of the Ninth Amendment contrasts sharply with the
artificial and unhelpful dichotomy between process and value
which Ely is at such pains to impose, even to the extent of denying
that judges have important choices to make. A clue to this
penchant for antiseptic adjudication lurks in the first eleven pages
2 34
of the Foreword3 s which Ely all but jettisoned for the book.
There, Ely repeatedly associates the unpalatable tenor of the Burger Court with the sin of imposing values:
One can . . . identify a strong strain in the jurisprudence of the Burger

Court, one that did not so importantly influence the work of its predecessor.
That is the view that the Court should give content to the Constitution, in
particular to its more open-ended provisions, not by following the Carolene
Products approach of identifying the points at which our political process is
undeserving of trust, but rather by identifying and enforcing upon the politiare, according to one formula or another, truly
cal branches those values that
23 5
important or fundamental.

The value-imposition methodology of the Burger Court is inexorably linked, in Ely's mind, with the record of that Court in protecting minorities, 236 which according to Ely "is not good.

' 23 7

Even the

current Court's better decisions, such as those involving freedom of
expression, derive, says Ely, not from the process approach of
Carolene Products, "but rather from a jurisprudence that defines
the Court's role as one of protecting those values the Court regards
232. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 19 (1895)(Harlan, J., dissenting). See
generally W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONsTTuTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE OLD
LEGALITY 1889-1932, at 25-26 (1969).
233. Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HAv. L. REv. 5 (1978),
revised and reprinted as chapter 3 of J. ELY, supra note 3.
234. Emulating Justice Stone, Ely squirreled away an important part of his analysis in
a footnote. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 247-49 n.52.
235. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 248 n.52 (Although in general the Burger Court's constitutional decisions appear to "lack a theme", the Court does, especially in the area of procreative and family rights, utilize a "value-imposition methodology," protecting what it believes
to be important).
236. Ely, supra note 233, at 8, 12-14.
237. "Id.at 8.
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as truly fundamental."2 38 The problem, as Ely sees it, with basing
decisions on values and not process is that the results of such decisions are contingent on a particular Court's "rendition of America's
constellation of values,"239 making principled adjudication impossible. This balancing of values, Ely continues, "is not by any means
an orientation original to the Burger Court. It plainly marked the
work of the Court that decided Lochner v. New York and its 200case progeny."24 0 By now it should be obvious that a term like
"producing Lochner" or "Lochnering" is a Gabriel-horn phrase 24 1
which, when sounded, is meant to stop a line of analysis in its
tracks.4 2 Ely's complaint is an example of what is aptly called the
fallacy of institutionalism, 2 4' the false notion that an ill-conceived
decision demonstrates the unsuitability of courts for a major role
in the political process. Nothing has been adduced to show that
Lochner could not happen in a legislative or administrative
context.
The distinction Ely wants and needs to make to sustain his
process analysis as something more securely grounded than value
imposition simply will not work. Ely chooses not to lock horns with
the Burger Court on questions of values and priorities, but seeks
an unassailable high ground from which to impose his own preferences. This, then, is the heart of darkness, the Rosebud sled for the
process jurisprude: the reluctance to come out and articulate a
scheme of democratic values in favor of a misconceived straitjacket
or hyperthyroid role for the judiciary. "You can say a bunch of
words, but a constitutional connection . .. should require some'244
thing more than this.
238. Id. at 15.
239. Id. Cf. J. ELY, supra note 3, at 249 n.52 (the Burger Court protects those rights
which it believes to be fundamental).
240. Ely, supra note 233, at 15 (footnote omitted).
241. Stigler, Imperfections in the CapitalMarket, 75 J. POL. ECON. 287, 290 (1967),
quoted in R. BopK, THE ANITRUST PARADOx 147 (1978).
242. Certainly the Court itself has encouraged the denunciation of Lochner and its line
as an "era long ago passed into history." Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
See also Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 182 (1972)(Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v.
Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
243. Tribe, supra note 164, at 54-55. See also L. TRmE,supra note 21, at 452-55, 56467; Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 15 (1979).
244. Ely, supra note 233, at 11 n.40.
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IV. A FINAL WORD ON THE JUDICIAL POWER

Democratic theory and practice suppose no absolutely "right"
social or economic viewpoint. Different perspectives are to be
thrashed out, tailored, compromised. Yet the judiciary is often required to arrive at some objectively correct answer in arbitrating
among those views. Process theory, in seeking to align judicial review with democracy by denying substantive intervention, denies
not only the historic task of the American judiciary but also the
way rules work in social governance.
All theories possess the element of selection, i.e., of distortion.
A theory of judicial review will necessarily contain a certain degree
of simplification, but it should not be at the cost of coherence. Accordingly, the task of constitutional theory is to suggest only the
most important guiding concerns culled from the nation's political
tradition. Specifically, the paradoxes of judicial review are the
touchstone with which any such theory must deal.
As for the first paradox, keeping open the channels of political
change and response is surely a judicial task, but not the sole task.
The courts must ensure that the consensus which percolates
through one institution or another-a school board, an agency,
state legislature or Congress-does indeed fairly and authentically
represent the popular will. Inevitably judges reconcile conflicting
popular mandates by legislating interstitially. Interstitial legislation does not mean that only unimportant matters are involved:
interstices can connect vital organs. Consensus, moreover, is not an
undifferentiated mass waiting to be identified; a minority's ability
to pass legislation will be different from its ability to block legislation. This ability can be a function of wealth, access and organization, not necessarily widespread or intense sentiment.
Concerning the second paradox, the literal words of a text cannot serve as a governing constitution without discretion, statecraft,
and understanding. Footnote four teaches that there is a time to
act and a time to abstain. When and how much remains controversial. Another Lochner is always possible, for discretion logically entails the possibility of its abuse. What Langdell denied, what the
Realists reveled in, and what the Process school sought to curb or
at least render accountable, are, pace Ely, the value choices a judge
must make in applying a general charter to particular facts. Set"
against such discretion are institutional checks: an appellate hierarchy, professional and public opinion, even scholarly writing.
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With regard to the last paradox, the insulation of the courts
from direct political pressures does not mean monastic isolation
from the world at large. That is why the concerns of Justice Frankfurter have figured so prominently in this essay: he witnessed the
changing role of the judiciary beginning with the echoes of Langdell and Thayer, through the rise of twentieth-century First
Amendment doctrine, the drive for racial equality, down to the increasing federalization of services now irrevocably interwoven with
American life. It is his ultimate failure to justify a circumspect judiciary in times calling for strengthened constitutional guarantees
that New Process scholars seek to rectify.
Process theory, therefore, has correctly committed itself to
reconciling a non-representative judiciary with a society premised
on making most of its important decisions through popularlyelected assemblies. While protection of individual liberties will always be a paramount judicial task, it should not be oversimplified
at the expense of careful examination of the complete judicial
function. Irksome it may be to endure rule by Platonic Guardians,
but a judiciary articulating fundamental principles pursuant to a
legitimate diffusion of power is not Platonic autocracy, and without such a safeguard the scheme of government likely to emerge
would be more, much more, than irksome.

